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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are a common way for companies to grow their 
market share and diversify into new areas. There have been a lot of studies on M&A 
performance that show that many acquisitions fail to create any value for the 
acquirer. Also, these studies have usually focused only on single acquisitions, 
although many companies in fact do follow consistent acquisition strategies. 
 
This study looks at the existence and performance of acquisition strategies in a 
hypercompetitive industry. Hypercompetition is characterized by low entry-
barriers, rapid technological change and the lack of sustainable competitive 
advantages. In such an environment companies must constantly look for new 
resources, e.g. by acquisitions. 
 
The dataset consists of 1456 software firms and 3171 acquisitions they made 
during the time period 1970-2006.  The analysis included both survival analysis 
utilizing Cox-regression on panel data and OLS-regression to analyze the effect of 
acquisitions on profit as measured by EBIT. 
 
The results show that acquisitions from same segment and other segments in the 
same industry have a negative effect on the survival of the acquiring firm. 
Acquisitions from same segment, other segments and other industries do increase 
profit of the acquirer. However, expanding into new segments was less beneficial for 
profits and expanding at a high rate was damaging for both survival and profit. The 
results suggest that acquisitions are dangerous but they can be used to create 
positions of dominance that improve survival prospects in the long-term. 
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Yritysostot ja fuusiot ovat usein käytetty menetelmä yritysten pyrkiessä 
kasvattamaan markkinaosuuttaan ja luomaan uutta liiketoimintaa. Yritysostojen 
tuloksellisuutta on tutkittu laajasti, ja monet tutkimukset osoittavat, että suuri osa 
yrityskaupoista ei luo arvoa ostajalle. Suurin osa tutkimuksesta on kuitenkin 
keskittynyt yksittäisiin ostoihin, vaikka monet yritykset itse asiassa toteuttavat 
johdonmukaisia osto-ohjelmia. 
 
Tämä työ tutkii yritysostostrategioiden olemassaoloa ja tuloksellisuutta 
hyperkilpaillulla toiminnalla. Hyperkilpailun tunnusmerkkejä ovat matalat 
osallistumisen esteet, ripeä teknologian kehittymien sekä kestävän kilpailuedun 
puute. Nämä tekijät ajavat yritykset hankkimaan jatkuvasti uusia resursseja, 
esimerkiksi yritysostoilla. 
 
Tutkimuksen otos koostuu 1456 ohjelmistoalan yrityksestä sekä näiden 
suorittamista 3171 yritysostosta vuosina 1970 - 2006. Tutkimuksessa 
hyödynnettiin sekä Cox-regressiota käyttäen selviytymistä selitettävänä 
muuttujana että pienimmän neliösumman regressiota, jossa selitettävänä 
muuttujana oli taloudellista tilannetta kuvaava liikevoitto. 
 
Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että yritysostot samasta segmentistä samoin kuin 
saman toimialan eri segmenteistä ovat haitallisia yrityksen selviytymiselle. 
Yritysostot samasta segmentistä, toisista segmenteistä ja toiselta teollisuudenalalta 
lisäävät kuitenkin yrityksen voittoa. Laajentuminen uusille segmenteille vähensi 
näin luotua voittoa. Lisäksi nopea laajenemistahti heikensi sekä voittoa että 
selviytymistä. Yritysostot ovat vaarallisia yrityksille, mutta niitä voidaan käyttää 
toiminnan laajentamiseen, mikä parantaa yrityksen selviytymismahdollisuuksia. 
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Introduction
 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Acquisitions, different approaches to them, and their respective benefits to firms 
have been a subject of intense research interest. Most of these studies have tended 
to look only at individual acquisitions and some have even excluded companies that 
made several acquisitions during the research period (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Still 
several large companies such as Microsoft and Cisco engaged in more than 50 
acquisitions during the 1990s and there is no reason to expect such behavior to 
have disappeared or to be about to disappear. Such serial acquirers often exhibit a 
clear and consistent acquisition strategy that is an important part of the corporate 
strategy and defines what kind of targets the company is seeking (Hopkins, 1987b). 
The strategy or the acquisition program also define the rate of acquisition the 
company is seeking (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Companies with consistent 
acquisition strategies have been shown to perform better in the long-term than 
their competitors (Hopkins, 1987b; Laamanen & Keil, 2008). 
This study looks at acquisition strategies in a hypercompetitive industry. 
Such an industry is characterized by competitive advantages that, instead of being 
sustainable, are often short-lived as competitive activity on firm-level disrupts the 
linkages between conduct and performance (D’Aveni, 1994). So the firms in such an 
industry must take continuously new actions in order to sustain their 
competitiveness (Young et al., 1996). 
Although the thesis concerning the prevalence of hypercompetition and the 
trend towards hypercompetitive industries is criticized (McNamara et al., 2003; 
Wiggins & Ruefli, 2005) it is accepted that such industries do exist and the 
characteristics of hypercompetition are most evident in high-tech industries with 
low entry barriers (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Wiggins & Ruefli, 2005). This study 
focuses on one of such industries, namely the software industry. The reason for 
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focusing on only one industry is that software industry offers a sufficiently large 
data set of companies and acquisitions and because different industries may have 
different acquisition performance factors as suggested by Salo (2006) 
The aim of this study is to identify those acquisition strategies that give the 
best results in terms of survival and financial performance to companies in an 
industry where sustainable competitive advantages may be difficult to create and 
maintain. The study looks at how different types of acquisitions affect both 
performance and survival and how these effects differ depending on the financial 
health of the acquirer. 
1.2 Research question and objectives 
The research question of this study can be formulated as following: 
What kinds of acquisition strategies work best in a hypercompetitive industry? 
This can be divided into the following sub questions: 
What kind of acquisition strategies can be identified in a hypercompetitive industry? 
How do the results of these strategies differ on both survival and financial 
performance? 
These research questions are further developed into hypotheses in the third 
section and their answers are provided in the two last chapters. 
1.3 Research methods 
The theoretical background of this study is based on a literature review of both 
acquisition strategies and their performance and hypercompetitive industries. 
Additional streams of research are the complexity theory that allows the modeling 
of industry as a fitness landscape of different segments with various fitness values 
and research into intra-industry diversification that is an important motivation for 
acquisitions in the software industry. The material for the literature review was 
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mainly identified based on ISI Web of Science and Google Scholar search engines 
and expert inputs. 
The empirical part of the work consists of hypothesis constructing and then 
testing these hypotheses on a data set of 1400 software companies and their 
acquisitions in the period 1970-2006.  The hypotheses are tested using both Cox 
regression on survival analysis and OLS regression on the financial effects of 
acquisitions. 
1.4 Structure 
The study consists of six sections the first being the introduction. In the second 
section I will describe the ongoing and past research of acquisitions and their 
motives in order to identify existing categorizations of acquisition strategies. I will 
also review existing literature on hypercompetition and evolutionary perspective 
in general and software industry in particular. 
Based on thorough understanding of the literature I will formulate on my 
hypotheses concerning both intra- and inter-segment acquisition strategies that 
will increase survival rates in software industry. These hypotheses are presented 
on the third section of this study. 
The fourth section describes the data on which the empirical data used in 
this study and the methods and analyses used. The result of these analyses 
concerning both individual acquisitions and acquisition strategies are presented on 
the fifth section. 
The two last sections include both the conclusion of my results and its 
implications for managers and researchers as well as the discussion about the 
possible causes of the observed results. 
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2 Theoretical background 
In order to formulate my hypotheses I will review the discussion on the major 
subjects of my research: acquisitions and acquisition strategies, sources of 
competitive advantage and hypercompetition. When identifying acquisition 
strategies I as well review the literature on complexity theory as in that field there 
are ideas concerning search processes of organizations (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000) 
that can be applied to acquisitions strategies as well. As most of the studies on 
acquisition strategies focus on inter-industry diversification and the focus of this 
study is intra-industry diversification, I also review shortly the discussion about the 
differences between diversification inside an industry and across industry 
boundaries and how these affect the study. 
The section also includes a review of the industry dynamics of software 
industry to prove that the industry is indeed characterized by hypercompetition 
and thus theories about sources of competitive advantage can be applied to it. In 
this section I also try to identify the major ideas of research in order to formulate 
my research hypotheses concerning the acquisition strategies of a 
hypercompetitive industry. The process is shown in Figure 1. 
Theoretical background
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Figure 1: Structure of the chapter 
2.1 Competitive advantage vs. dynamic resources 
There exist conflicting theories as to what is the essence of a firm and how can its 
success factors be explained and predicted. Porter’s (1980) five forces model 
determines the success of a firm in relation to five outside influences. The model is 
the best known description of the so called structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm of industrial organization. The paradigm predicts that the performance of 
an industry is defined by the conduct of its suppliers and buyers and these again 
are a function of the industry structure (Bain, 1959; Mason, 1939). Although the 
paradigm was originally applied in industrial organization, it has since made a 
successful leap to the field of strategic management (McWilliams & Smart, 1993). 
The model is presented in Figure 2. 
Acquisition 
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Figure 2: Five-forces model of competition 
In Porter’s model the firm erects entry barriers in order to protect its 
competitive advantages. Competitive advantage is simply defined as “when a firm 
creates more economic value than its rivals” (Barney, 2007). These competitive 
advantages enable the company to generate rents or profit above the risk-weighted 
cost of capital. 
The model has been criticized for presenting competition as a static 
equilibrium with little endogenous change (Thomas, 1996). Scientifical 
innovations, capital markets and government interventions are all left out of the 
model, although Porter (1980) describes them as well in his seminal book on the 
subject. 
In the resource-based view as presented by Penrose (1959) and Barney 
(1991) firm is seen as a bundle of resources  that is more or less unique. These 
resources represent those tangible or intangible assets that are tied 
semipermanently to the firm (Caves, 1980). Sustainable competitive advantage is 
created by resources that should create value for the company, be rare and hard to 
imitate and also have little if any substitutes (Barney 1991). Value creation 
Suppliers Customers 
Substitute
s 
Potential 
entrants 
Industry 
competitors 
Theoretical background
 
   
7 
   
 
 
happens by operating such a bundle in an industry where the competitors can not 
match the offering. 
As the resources are not interchangeable and tend to appear in lumps it 
often happens that a firm has a surplus of one resource to what is needed for its 
current production. When faced with this kind of excess in e.g. managerial skills, 
the firm has an internal incentive to diversify in order to utilize fully the existing 
resource base (Penrose, 1959).  
 Both of these theories offer compelling rationales why acquisitions exist and 
why they might be beneficial for the acquirer. Porter (1980) suggests acquisitions 
as a method of entering new businesses but notes that the acquirer is likely to 
benefit only in cases of imperfect markets. When efficient markets exist, the 
acquisition price is likely to reflect earnings opportunities and thus no abnormal 
profit can be racked up. Also acquisitions that bring in market share in existing 
businesses and thus help to improve operations can be useful. 
 When firms are seen as unique bundles of resources, acquisitions are most 
useful when they can either bring in some needed resources or an oversupply of 
existing resources can be utilized in new business (Penrose, 1959). Even in these 
cases acquisitions are most likely to succeed when they are done in a gradual 
manner (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
2.2 Acquisitions and their motives 
Whereas theories of competitive advantage look at acquisitions as only one of the 
possible means to an end that is the improved competitive position, there exist a 
whole research stream dedicated to acquisitions and what drives firms to 
undertake them. As the value of mergers and acquisitions has increased during the 
last two decades (Schoenberg, 2003) so has the volume of this stream. This 
research has produced many taxonomies of acquisitions and also of the motives 
that companies have in undertaking them. As these categorizations are related to 
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the context of the acquisitions and the possible methods of value creation 
(Swaminathan et al., 2008) they are also important in understanding the discussion 
about acquisition strategies. 
In his article about the motives for acquisitions Trautwein (1990) presents 
seven different theories that are most prominently used in explaining acquisitions. 
Four of these assume wealth is created or at least transferred to the acquiring 
company’s shareholders. These are efficiency theory, raider theory, monopoly 
theory and valuation theory. They also see acquisitions as a planned, rational 
choice. Empire-building theory assumes that mergers are mostly taken to satisfy 
managers’ ambitions and all benefits accrue to them. However, the choice is still 
rational unlike in the last two theories: process theory and disturbance theory. 
Former implies that merger is an outcome of strategy as an emerging process as 
presented by the learning school (Mintzberg, 1990). The latter theory takes 
mergers as symptoms of an economy wide process in which economic disturbances 
cause disturbances in asset valuations. 
Of the motives suggested by Trautwein only the efficiency theory takes into 
account the existence of the two firms as little else as platforms from which the 
managers can launch their attacks on unsuspecting targets. The resource-based 
view of the firm as presented by Barney (1991) and Wernerfelt (1984) gives much 
more weight to the existing assets and resources of the firm. The resource-based 
view of a firm actually suggests a motive for acquisitions as firms may thus be able 
to build new resource-bundles that could not be traded on the market (Wernerfelt, 
1984). Matsusaka (2001) suggest that acquisitions may also be a way of utilizing 
managerial skills and abilities in a declining industry. This would be close to the 
efficiency theory but with little respect to the business of the original firm as the 
skills can be deployed broadly across industry. 
There also exist financial motives for acquisitions other than taking 
advantage of incorrect valuation or lowering the cost of capital that are suggested 
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by Trautwein (1990). Firms may engage in acquisitions in order to diversify the 
firm’s portfolio and in this way reduce volatility of the cash flow. In a similar vein 
they may try to reduce the risk of bankruptcy by diversifying revenue streams and 
in effect insuring themselves with acquisitions (Anand & Singh, 1997). 
The different motives for acquisition presented above also differ in how 
likely they are to lead into consistent acquisition strategy. Acquisitions driven by 
motives of efficiency and monopoly would lead to a strategy of consolidation within 
the industry or business segment. Matsusaka’s (2001) view of acquisitions as a 
method of utilizing skills that are underused in a declining business would suggest 
an acquisition strategy based on diversification and unrelated acquisitions. 
2.3 Acquisition strategies 
Research into acquisition motives is usually concerned with individual acquisitions 
only. The focus of this study, however, is the effect that acquisitions have over a 
time frame of several years on the focal firm’s performance. Existing research of 
acquisition strategies has often been focused on industrial companies but if offers 
important guidelines as to what sort of strategies might be used in the software 
industry. 
In looking at different acquisitions it is important to classify them by some 
objective measure. A common division is whether the acquisition represents 
unrelated or related diversification (Hopkins, 1987b; Montgomery & Wilson, 
1986). This stems from the fact that many earlier studies relied on data provided 
by the FTC that divided acquisitions into horizontal, vertical, product-extension, 
market-extension or unrelated. The first four categories were lumped together as 
related acquisitions and the last one was treated as an unrelated acquisition 
(Montgomery & Wilson, 1986). In the FTC categorization unrelatedness meant a 
different market or industry. It has also been used to describe a different strategic 
emphasis such as focusing on marketing instead of R&D (Swaminathan et al., 
Theoretical background
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2008). 
In his article about acquisitions from a resource-based view Wernerfelt used 
two categories that were in effect similar to the related / unrelated taxonomy. He 
called these complimentary or supplementary acquisitions depending on whether 
the firm was strengthening its existing resources or acquiring new ones 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Wernerfelt speculated that the best way to maximize existing 
market imperfections and acquire companies at low prices would be to build on 
one’s most unusual resource. This way the company should be able to enter 
markets with relatively few targets but also a low level of competition. 
Such rough categories fail to take into account the various motives behind 
the acquisitions as suggested by Bower (Bower, 2001). He divided acquisitions into 
five categories with distinct motives: to deal with overcapacity, to roll-up 
competitors to gain geographical clout, to extend into new products or markets, to 
substitute for R&D, and to invent a new industry. These are all also suited for 
different industries, the fourth type being most evident within emerging industries 
like software. The motives as suggested by Bower see acquisition strategy and 
corporate strategy in general in a much more deterministic process with firms as 
rational actors. This is reminiscent of the planning school of strategy with its tools 
of rational analysis and established categories as described by Mintzberg (1994). 
Where Bower looked at acquisitions only as singular activities, Hopkins 
(1987a) studied the question whether firms indeed do exhibit consistent 
acquisition behavior that could be described as strategies. He identified altogether 
eight categories six of which were consistent (non-diversified, related/non-
diversified, mixed-related, marketing-related, technology-related and financially-
linked acquisitions) and two that were not (composite and reversal) (Hopkins, 
1987a).  A company was seen to follow a particular strategy if two-thirds or more 
of its acquisition were in the same category. 
Non-diversified acquisitions were those that were mainly horizontal or 
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vertical in nature. Marketing-related were those where the acquirer and the target 
were in similar markets or with similar marketing characteristics. In a similar way 
technology-related acquisitions had firms with similar production or technological 
characteristics as their targets. Mixed-related was a group with acquisitions of both 
of the former types. Related/non-diversified was a combination of all of the above. 
Financially linked acquisition were those with no linkage to existing businesses. 
The composite strategy included firms that either alternated between diversified, 
related and financial strategies or that shifted comprehensively from one to 
another during the research period. Reversal included companies that changed 
from emphasizing acquisitions to strategies that emphasized divestitures (Hopkins, 
1987a). 
The above-mentioned studies suggest that acquisition strategies can be used 
to either strengthen the position of the acquirer in its existing markets by 
consolidating the segment or they can be used to enter new geographical markets 
or business segments. In the latter option the firm can utilize its existing resources 
in expanding the new business. With limited resources for acquisitions available, 
these options are usually at least somewhat exclusive, and the firms must make 
choices between them based on their relative attractiveness.  
2.4 Acquisition performance 
Research of acquisition performance is focusing on two separate but interlinked 
questions. Do acquisitions overall create value? If yes, what sort of acquisitions 
creates the most value, and how much of this is attributed to the acquirer? 
On the first question there is also a lot of research into whether acquisitions 
succeed in creating value (Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Shelton, 
1988, Hopkins, 1987b). These studies have mainly focused on shareholder values 
and have tended to model these with identifying short-term abnormal stock market 
returns (Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Shelton, 1988). Longer-term 
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measures include Tobin’s q, pre-tax cash-flows and analyst ratings (Anand & Singh, 
1997; Hayward, 2002). The results show that acquisitions do indeed create value, 
although the effect is clearer for target companies. 
For the second question there exists a wide stream of research on the 
performance of different acquisition strategies and their relative benefits (Hopkins, 
1987a; Hopkins, 1987b; Montgomery & Wilson, 1986). Earlier of these studies 
tended to look at large industrial companies (Hopkins, 1987b; Montgomery & 
Wilson, 1986). Recently there has also been research in service industries such as 
banking (Haleblian et al., 2006). Their results suggest that related acquisitions 
create more value than unrelated yields answers with majority agreeing with the 
claim (Anand & Singh, 1997; Rheaume, 2008; Singh & Montgomery, 1987). 
However the theoretical basis for this is controversial with Seth arguing that there 
is no reason why related acquisitions should create more value (Seth, 1990). 
The study of Hopkins (1987a) into the existence and performance was 
presented above. Hopkins’s results were that companies that exhibited strategic fit 
in their acquisitions, namely they built their acquisitions around one core strength 
whether it was marketing or technology, fared better when measured with return 
on assets and return on sales than those that had broader, less focused strategies. 
These studies look mostly on the performance of individual acquisitions and 
what factors affect their success rate. A more long-term view on acquisition 
strategies is taken by Laamanen & Keil in their research on acquisition programs 
(2008). They show that a high rate of acquisitions affects negatively stock-market 
performance of the acquirer in a three year window. However, those companies 
that undertook more than 10 acquisitions in the 1990s fared better in the long run 
than their competitors that made only 4-9 acquisitions. Also the variance of the 
acquisition rate had a significant negative impact so that those companies with 
regular acquisitions had a better performance. Similarly to the results of Hayward 
(2002) they found that prior acquisition experience could reduce these negative 
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effects on performance. 
Identified acquisition strategies and performance drivers as well as the 
findings from earlier studies are presented in Table 1. There is no clear consensus 
of the relative benefits of diversification versus consolidation with both sides 
having several supporters. However, it seems clear that both types of acquisitions 
can create value to the acquirer. In the listed studies diversification was usually 
taken to mean acquisitions outside the industry. In the context of software industry 
diversification refers more to intra-industry diversification as described by Li and 
Greenwood (2004). They note that as the performance drivers in intra-industry 
diversification differ considerably from those in its inter-industry counterpart, 
lessons from studies of the latter can not be directly applied to the former. Next 
chapter will look more closely into what these differences are. 
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Table 1: Identified acquisition strategies and performance drivers 
Acquisition Strategies/ types Source Measures of success Findings 
Complementary / supplementary 
Wernerfelt 
1984     
Non-diversified, related/non-diversified, 
mixed-related, marketing-related, 
technology-related, financially-linked, 
composite and reversal 
Hopkins 
1987a ROA, ROE, sales growth 
Acquisition strategies based on 'strategic fit' 
fare better than less focused strategies 
Conglomerate, technology-related, 
marketing-related 
Hopkins 
1987b 
Market share, market concentration, 
market growth, and market 
profitability. 
Acquisition activity, in general, is associated 
with deterioration in market position. 
Product concentric, horizontal and 
market concentric, conglomerate and 
vertical 
Lubatkin 
1987 Abnormal stock returns (monthly) 
Acquisitions create value, but related 
diversification may not be better than others 
Related and unrelated diversification Singh 1987 Abnormal stock returns (daily) 
Acquisitions create value, but related 
diversification is better than others 
Unrelated, related complimentary, related 
supplementary and identical Shelton 1988 
Abnormal stock returns (3-day period 
around the first rumor) 
Acquisitions create value, but related 
diversification is better than others 
Unrelated, related Seth 1990 
Abnormal stock returns (5-day period 
around the first rumor) 
Acquisitions create value, but related 
diversification may not be better than others 
Consolidation-oriented and 
diversification-oriented Anand 1997 
Abnormal stock market returns; pretax 
operating cash flows and Tobin's q 
Diversification-oriented acquisitions fare 
worse than consolidation-oriented 
Consolidation, geographical 
consolidation, products or market 
extension, R&D substitution and 
inventing an industry Bower 2001     
Market-entering, market-strengthening, 
market-elaborating, market-extending 
Hayward 
2002 
Abnormal stock returns and analyst 
ratings 
Similarity of firms, small prior acquisition 
losses and experience of prior acquisitions 
increase success rate of acquisitions 
Unrelated, related 
Rheaume 
2008 Abnormal stock returns (2-day period) 
Acquisitions create value and related 
diversification is better than others 
Related, diversification, consolidation 
Swaminathan 
2008 Abnormal stock returns 
The relative value of unrelated vs. related 
diversification depends on the motive of the 
merger 
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2.5 Intra-industry diversification 
Most of the studies on diversification and acquisitions as a method to achieve it 
have focused on the relative benefits of related or unrelated diversification across 
industries (Li & Greenwood, 2004; Palich et al., 2000). In intra-industry context the 
separation between unrelated and related diversification is less clear, although 
Eggers and Siggelkow (2009) suggest the terms diversification and exploration, 
respectively, for the two. The amount of studies focusing solely on diversification 
inside an industry is much lower (Li & Greenwood, 2004; Sebrek, 2008; Siggelkow, 
2003; Eggers & Siggelkow, 2009). This difference is important as the potential 
benefits of intra-industry diversification are clearly different from those in inter-
industry diversification (Li & Greenwood, 2004). 
 Firms can benefit from intra-industry diversification in three ways. First is 
the same logic of resource utilization as presented in the resource-based view 
(Penrose, 1959). In the context of a single industry this is even more evident 
because the similarity of inputs and outputs is likely to be much higher and so the 
potential for economies of scope is bigger (Li & Greenwood, 2004). 
 Secondly, firms that enter multiple market niches are likely to increase the 
amount of markets in which they have contact with their competitors. This 
increased contact will actually result in a lower level of competition as the 
competition moves from a stand-alone game with single moves to a game that is 
played repeatedly across several markets (Gimeno & Woo, 1996). In such an 
environment aggressive competitive actions are much more likely to be punished 
and the incentive to initiate such moves is correspondingly lower. Firms also 
acquire increasing knowledge of their competitors which enables them to correctly 
estimate potential responses to any considered actions (Li & Greenwood, 2004). An 
added benefit of multi-market contact is that, as the amount of firms competing in a 
given segment increases, it becomes more difficult for new competitors to enter the 
market due to the rising entry barriers (Sebrek, 2008). 
Theoretical background
 
   
16 
   
 
 
Intra-industry diversification can also be thought of in the context of real 
options (Sebrek, 2008). Here the diversification efforts can be seen as buying call 
options on the particular niche of the market. This is especially so in software 
industry where the speed of technological innovation means that general 
capabilities are often more important than an individual product generation 
(Thomas, 1996). In his study Sebrek (2008) looks mostly at the technological forms 
of diversification such as patents or technology alliances. They offer a way for the 
company to diversify its R&D efforts in several directions without incurring 
additional costs. However, acquisitions that are motivated by R&D as suggested by 
Bower (2001) have quite similar dynamics in that they usually represent a 
relatively minor initial investment that is later on followed by a bigger payout – i.e. 
exercising the option. 
 From the consumer’s point of view intra-industry diversification offers an 
additional important benefit. Consumers often prefer one-stop shopping in their 
businesses and companies that offer a better selection of products or services may 
attract more customers even though the individual products would not be best of 
their class (Siggelkow, 2003). The effect is reliant on the existence of shopping 
costs for the customer should he choose to pick products from several providers. 
Empirical evidence on the benefits of intra-industry diversification is thin. Li 
and Greenwood (2004) found in their study of Canadian insurance industry that 
although diversification in itself did not improve performance, the increased multi-
market contact with competitors was beneficial.  
Siggelkow (2003) found out that in the US mutual fund industry fund 
performance was in fact adversely linked to the breadth of products each fund 
family had to offer. However, fund inflows were proportional to the breadth of 
product portfolio. In effect, diversification was bad for the customers but good for 
the owners. Siggelkow explains the findings by noting that only those fund families 
offering a broad portfolio fall in to the choice set of a customer or financial advisor. 
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Later Eggers and Siggelkow (2009) expanded the study to look whether the key 
success factor was diversification randomly across product categories or was an 
exploration strategy of expanding in closely related categories more beneficial. 
They found that exploration was linked to firm performance by a U-shaped curve in 
that fund families could benefit either from very low or very high levels of 
exploration. However, exploration beyond random diversification was not related 
to firm survival in any ways.  
Mutual funds are an example of a Schumpeterian industry with rapid 
product life-cycles and low entry barriers, but although the results of Eggers and 
Siggelkow are interesting, it has to be noted that they are limited to a small niche of 
the financial services industry and thus may not be generalized easily.  
Software industry offers several potential upsides of intra-industry 
diversification. As the industry consists of several businesses that often utilize 
similar technology but have different customers and products, companies can try to 
reduce the volatility of their revenues as suggested by Anand and Singh (1997).  
They can also escape maturing or declining businesses by diversifying into new 
segments (Matsusaka, 2001). A closer look at how and when this is done is 
presented in the next chapter on how industry landscape can be modeled by 
complexity theory. 
2.6 Complexity theory and acquisition strategies 
The concept of fitness landscapes was originally developed in evolutionary biology 
(Kauffman, 1993; Wright, 1931). It describes the evolutionary process of variation 
and selection on the level of an individual combination of genes. The fitness of the 
landscape refers to the amount of resources an organism can access in a particular 
location. The fitness of the organism refers to the locations and resources it has 
access to. Over time organisms that succeed will have developed a unique 
combination of characteristics in order to access sufficient amount of resources to 
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grow and reproduce. An important aspect of the model is that as evolutionary 
characteristics are acquired in a random process and as there may exist several 
fitness peaks with abundant resources (“rugged” landscape), one landscape can 
produce several, separate organisms that each dominate in their own environment.  
Figure 3 presents both a smooth landscape with only one fitness peak and a 
rugged landscape with several peaks. 
 
Figure 3: Smooth and rugged fitness landscapes (Levinthal & Warglien, 1999) 
Fitness landscapes can also be used to model organizations and their 
strategic choices as well as those of individuals and teams (Levinthal, 1997; 
Levinthal & Warglien, 1999). Here the landscape refers to the organizational forms 
that are available to the organization and the fitness of the forms is merely the 
likelihood of survival that they provide to the organization. In other words the rate 
of survival for a particular organization is determined by its fitness level relative to 
the fittest organization in the population (Wilson & Bossert, 1971).  
The organization in such a landscape starts out with an organizational form 
and in an attempt to increase its fitness it will adapt to different forms. However, 
this search process is path dependent and heavily influenced by the original form 
adopted at birth (Stinchcombe, 1965). So the same environment can produce 
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several dominant companies with very different organizational forms depending 
on their origin and the path they have taken, especially if the landscape is very 
rugged with several peaks. 
The topology of the fitness landscape is defined by the level of 
interdependence between the different attributes (Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal & 
Warglien, 1999). When there is little interaction between the attributes then the 
landscape is relatively smooth as a change in one attribute only affects its local 
fitness value. As the level of interdependence increases, the landscape becomes 
more rugged as a change in one attribute can have a significant effect on the fitness 
value of other attributes as well. This interdependence is known as epistatic to 
population biologists (Smith, 1989). 
Kauffman (1993) has created a model for analyzing the interactions in such 
a landscape. The model, termed NK model by Kauffman, describes an entity, 
organization or organism, as having N characteristics, each with a binary value, 0 or 
1. In each environment there can thus exist 2N unique organizations. The level of 
interdependence between the attributes is specified by the variable K. So if each 
attribute were influenced by e.g. 3 other attributes K would have a value of 3. In the 
simplest version NK= {N, 0} so all attributes are fully independent of each other. 
The most complex model has NK= {N, N-1} so the fitness value of every attribute is 
dependent also on the value of every other attribute. Thus every attribute can have 
2K+1 different values and the total fitness value is calculated as an average of the 
individual fitness values of the attributes (Levinthal, 1997). 
The level of K affects the landscape in two ways. First of all, in a landscape 
with low K two firms with similar values in all attributes but one should have fairly 
similar fitness values as the maximum difference between them is (K+1)/N. So the 
level of K defines the ruggedness of the landscape or the correlation between 
location and fitness (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). 
Secondly, K describes the amount of possible peaks in the landscape. When 
Theoretical background
 
   
20 
   
 
 
K=0, there is only one possible peak which is both local and global maximum, since 
each attribute can be optimized locally to produce the global optimum (Siggelkow 
& Levinthal, 2003). As the level of interdependence increases local optimization no 
longer results in the global maximum as an improvement in one attribute can have 
an adverse effect on one or several other attributes. So there may exist several local 
peaks where a change in any one attribute leaves the organization with a lower 
fitness value even if a change in several or all of the attributes could place the 
organization at the global peak with the highest possible fitness value (Kauffman, 
1993; Levinthal, 1997). 
When organizations look out for new and better forms they can follow one 
of several alternative adaptation processes. First, the firm can map its immediate 
neighborhood in a local search process by alternating only one attribute at a time 
(Levinthal, 1997; March & Simon, 1995). If it finds a configuration with a higher 
fitness value, it can adapt to that without incurring additional costs. This search is 
based on the firms past experience and knowledge and has also been dubbed as 
“experiential search” (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). Such local search works best in a 
relatively smooth landscape where the firm can “walk” its way to the global peak 
(Levinthal & Warglien, 1999). 
Another way for the firm to search for superior forms is the random 
adaptation of completely new forms (Kauffman, 1993; March & Simon, 1958; 
Nelson & Winter 1982). This can be the result of either innovative activity, 
transformative technological change or the result of a previous failure. In such 
“long-jumps” it is assumed that the firms are not omniscient and it has to make its 
search in a more or less random way. The likelihood of a firm finding an improved 
position via random search is thus inversely related to its current success 
(Levinthal, 1997). This creates endogenous organizational inertia in the model with 
more successful organizations engaging more in local adaptation and less in 
random search. A slightly different model sees the firm searching based on its 
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cognitive map of the landscape that may not correspond fully with reality 
(Levinthal & Warglien, 1999). 
In order to solve the problem of how to capture the value of the innovative 
nature of random search without losing the knowledge gained in current position 
organizations may engage in a search process known as recombination where they 
combine parts of different regions of the landscape (Levinthal & Warglien, 1999). 
Especially, if the regions have strong epistatic effects and the parts are known to 
have high fitness values, such recombination may enable a beneficial change in the 
total fitness as the highest peaks tend to lie close to each other (Kauffman, 1993). 
This result is reflected in the study of Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) into the 
relationship between organizational form and exploration. They found that firms 
that are able to temporarily reduce their level of centralization and engage in 
multiple exploration processes whose results can then be regrouped in a process of 
centralization fare better than pure centralized or de-centralized competitors. 
Based on a different theoretical foundation, Matsusaka (2001) has 
developed a model that shows the diversification of firms as a search process 
aiming to match the organizational capabilities with suitable businesses. The 
motive for this search process is a decline in the original business which can be 
seen as analogical to the population pressures in fitness landscape. 
Studies on how organizations adapt to different fitness landscapes have up 
to date been either purely theoretical (Levinthal & Warglien, 1999) or have relied 
on simulation data with only empirical anecdotes to prove correspondence to real-
world behavior (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007; Levinthal, 
1997; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003, 2005; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2007). There is as of 
yet no empirical proof and evidence of the correlation between organizational 
design and firm performance is mixed (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2007). 
Originally fitness landscape was perceived as a static concept. However 
Levinthal (1997) has shown in his modeling study that there is no reason for the 
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landscape to remain constant. A Schumpeterian industry with changing 
competitive dynamics e.g. software industry, can be thought of as having a rugged 
landscape that is being redesigned at irregular intervals. The effect that 
competitor’s actions have on the payoffs and fitness values has been modeled as a 
game theoretic problem with a better-than-Nash-equilibrium solution when the 
game is repeated (Levinthal & Warglien, 1999). Also the firm may use strategic 
alliances in its exploration process in order to map a wider area with local search 
(Sebrek, 2008). 
Complexity theory helps to explain why both intra- and inter-segment 
acquisitions might make sense to a firm depending on its external environment. For 
a firm that is able to wrestle itself into a better position in its own segment by 
acquiring a local competitor it is beneficial to make an intra-segment acquisition. 
Respectively, for a firm that is facing an unattractive segment where it has no 
possibility to climb onto a better location inter-segment or even inter-industry 
acquisitions might be more useful. 
2.7 Hypercompetition 
As stated earlier, most of the studies on acquisition strategies and performance 
have been done in the context of industrial firms. As software industry differs quite 
a lot from more traditional industries it is important to observe these differences in 
more detail. Here I will use the concept of hypercompetition as presented by 
D’Aleni (1994) to describe the industry and its competitive settings. 
The idea that capitalism is a constantly changing process where fiercest 
competition evolves from within was already presented by Schumpeter (1942) in 
his writing about the creative destruction. The description of Schumpeter was in 
direct contrast to the writings of such strategy gurus as Porter that described 
competition evolving predictably through the five forces that affect competitive 
forces (1980). Evidence of the existence of this competitive shift in the form of 
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decreasing persistence of abnormal profits in an increasing amount of industries 
was presented by Wiggins and Ruefli (2005). 
Later the rapidly changing competitive environment has been described as 
hypercompetition. Such environment is characterized by D’Aveni (1994, 1995, 
1999) as experiencing rapid technological and other forms of change, rapid 
product-lifecycles, lack of any competitive equilibrium states and little or no entry 
barriers, so new competitors are able to enter and transform the industry. In 
D’Avenis view hypercompetition is the following step from an oligopoly – a state 
where competition is high but abnormal profits can still be made (1995). 
The five-force model as presented by Porter saw competition as a static 
force with most competitive pressure focusing on price. Dynamic competition, or 
hypercompetition, forces firms to constantly create new strategic assets to gain 
competitive advantage (Thomas, 1996). Such an environment favors firms with 
more flexible forms than the rigid, monopolies or oligopolies of the early 20th 
century (Volberda, 1996). 
Hypercompetition may not affect all industries equally. Characteristics of 
industries that are particularly susceptible to hypercompetition are (1) consumer 
demand, (2) the knowledge base of firms and associated workers, (3) the declining 
height of entry barriers, and (4) the increasing frequency of alliances among firms 
(D’Aveni, 1994). Thomas (1996) has classified three factors that increase the 
dynamic resourcefulness – the capability and need to create new strategic 
resources - of industries. These factors are (1) transactor dynamism, factors of 
demand and supply that produce new innovations, (2) knowledge base, the depth 
and width of knowledge in the industry and (3) entry conditions, dynamism of the 
market structure. Examples of such industries include airlines and high-technology 
industries (Gimeno & Woo, 1996). Even in industries with such characteristics the 
emergence of hypercompetition often requires a transformational event such as 
changing demographics, looming bankruptcy of a major player in the industry or 
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the emergence of a foreign competitor with little capabilities for cooperative 
actions (Craig, 1996; D’Aveni, 1995; Nath & Newell, 1998).  
The existence of hypercompetition and hypercompetitive industries is today 
accepted but the prevalence of hypercompetition is still argued about (Wiggins and 
Ruefli, 2005). Although D’Aveni (1994, 1995) and later Thomas (1996) stated that 
hypercompetition is increasing and a hypercompetitive shift took place in the US 
between 1950s and 1980s, their argument has raised opposition. The prevalence of 
hypercompetition may also vary in the course of time and is not necessarily a one-
way trend (McNamara et al., 2003). 
In his study on the emergence of hypercompetition in Japanese beer 
industry Craig (1996) identified two types of capabilities that are needed to 
succeed in the environment. Specialized capabilities are those that are needed to 
prosper in a single round of hypercompetition by initiating a particular competitive 
advantage such as new product development. Because of the difficulties in creating 
specialized capabilities, they enable the company to collect oversized rents until 
competitors catch up or external forces shape the competitive landscape. 
Development of such capabilities may be hard for an organization that has been 
successful in a situation with static competition. In the case of market leading 
Japanese brewery an acute crisis of sales and profitability was required to 
implement the change of attitudes and processes (Craig, 1996). 
General capabilities represent more complex bundles of resources and skills 
to activate resources. A company with general capabilities is capable of competing 
effectively for several rounds of hypercompetition and is able to introduce new 
sources of competitive advantage repeatedly (Craig, 1996). Craig argues that such 
capabilities represent the only sustainable source of competitive advantage in a 
hypercompetitive environment. Similar arguments are made by D’Aveni (1995) 
who lists the new seven S’s - the elements that companies need in order to find and 
build temporary competitive advantages. These are superior stakeholder 
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satisfaction, strategic soothsaying, speed, surprise, sifting the rules of game, 
signaling strategic intent and simultaneous and sequential strategic thrusts. 
A conflicting opinion is presented by Makadok (1997) who researched first- 
and early-mover advantages in money market mutual fund industry. The industry 
has low entry barriers and high imitability that should make it suitable for 
hypercompetition and erosion of first-mover advantages. Makadok showed that the 
companies that entered a segment first still showed considerable pricing and 
market-share advantage in comparison with their competitors. He explained the 
findings with the sluggishness of demand and the psychological costs of changing 
funds. Although the results may not be easily generalized they show that even in 
seemingly hypercompetitive industries it is possible to succeed with traditional 
competitive advantages. 
Hypercompetition may take the forms of several rounds with the 
competitive advantage in each round coming from different source (Craig, 1996). 
The rounds may be distinguished by for example successive product generations. 
The rapid introduction of new product generations and the low entry barriers 
mean that firms may be forced to introduce new products even though that would 
be cannibalize their profits from existing products (Nault & Vandenbosch, 1996). 
An example of such behavior is the introduction of constantly new razor 
generations by Gillette in order to keep its main competitor behind (D’Aveni, 
1999). Sengupta (2002) has developed a model that seeks to explain the effects of 
innovations and access to efficiency in hypercompetition. 
In a hypercompetitive industry firms face two pressures. On one hand they 
are constantly challenged to develop new technology and introduce new products. 
On the other hand the intense competition that drives this technological 
development reduces the cashflow that is needed to support the R&D efforts 
(Thomas, 1996). This dynamic can easily lead firms to make acquisitions in order 
to take advantage of others R&D as suggested by Bower (2001). 
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In s-c-p model firm performance was inversely linked to intensity of 
competition so that strong competition was likely to lower firm performance 
(Porter, 1980). In hypercompetition competition is beneficial to a certain level - the 
performance of firms is linked to competitive rivalry through an inverse U-form 
(Thomas, 1996). 
Success in a hypercompetitive industry is dependent on the capability of 
firm to take constant competitive actions (Ferrier et al., 1999; Young et al., 1996). 
These actions include but are not constrained to pricing actions such as discounts, 
marketing actions such as promotions and advertising campaigns, product actions 
like new product launches, capacity actions that include both new investments and 
increases of existing capacity, legal actions like law suits and signaling actions such 
as public statements and press announcements (Ferrier et al., 1999). Young and his 
colleagues (1996) showed that the level of such activity is directly related to the 
profitability of a firm. A higher level of competitive actions also slows down the 
market share erosion and dethronement that are otherwise inevitable in a 
hypercompetitive industry (Ferrier et al., 1999). 
Successful firms may also exhibit what has been termed as ‘continuous 
morphing’. This is defined as ”significant changes in the ranges of products and 
services offered, along with recon- figurations of the resources, capabilities, and 
structures employed to deliver the extended range of products and services” (Rindova 
& Kotha, 2001). In the context of software industry this can mean a change in the 
source of core revenue source as in the case of Yahoo from a simple search engine 
to an Internet portal with a variety of complimentary services (Rindova & Kotha, 
2001).  
In a hypercompetitive industry the pressures to take competitive actions, 
acquisitions among them are higher than in more stable industries. This can lead to 
more acquisitions taking place than in a less competitive environment but it should 
also mean that acquisitions, when successful, really help the acquirer to achieve a 
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temporary competitive advantage and improve financial performance. 
2.8 Software industry 
Using D’Aveni’s four-fold categorization of industries (1999) software industry 
could be best categorized as disequilibrium. Such industries experience constant 
disruptions by both incumbents trying to shake out their emerging competitors as 
well as challengers that are trying to take advantage of their slow-moving 
opponents. In the Schumpeterian spirit most of the value creation in such 
industries accrues to the innovators who create new products and succeed in their 
IPO. 
Of the four preconditions for hypercompetition (D’Aveni, 1994) software 
industry fills easily two, namely low entry barriers and high knowledge-base of 
employees and firms. Also the last two, consumer demand and increasing level of 
alliances are evident as reported by Young et al. (1996). 
Software industry is also a typical example of a multimarket industry as 
defined by Gimeno &Woo (1996) “a group of distinct markets (i.e., markets for 
products or services that are not strong demand substitutes) that are strongly related 
on the supply side by the use of similar technologies and capabilities.”  
The fierceness of competition between two firms under in such an industry 
under hypercompetitive conditions is proportional to the strategic similarity of the 
two as well as inversely proportional to the amount of multi-market contact 
between them (Gimeno & Woo, 1996). The strongest competition is between firms 
with very similar strategic emphasis but relatively few common markets. 
Software industry has previously been studied as an example of a 
hypercompetitive industry by Young et al. (1996). Their hypothesis was that the 
amount of industry-level competitive activity such as product launches and 
marketing campaigns would have a negative effect on firm performance whereas 
such activity on firm-level would increase that performance. They also studied the 
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effect of industry-level horizontal cooperation such as M&As, licensing and 
technology consortia on the firm-level competitive activity. They found significant 
positive relationship between firm-level competitive actions and firm performance 
measured by return on assets and return on sales. However, they did not separate 
acquisitions from other competitive actions taken by firms. 
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3 Hypotheses 
In this section I will present my hypotheses as well as the thought process behind 
them and the conceptual and theoretical ground on which they are based.  The 
basis of the hypotheses lies in the diverse literature presented in the earlier section 
and its application into the topic, namely acquisition strategies in a 
hypercompetitive industry. 
Hypotheses concerning only the pattern and timing of acquisitions give 
management information about the rate and intervals in which the planned 
acquisitions should take place. However, they give no insight into what would be 
suitable targets of acquisitions and where the company can use them to achieve 
growth. 
Conversely, studies that only look at acquisitions in terms of how diversified 
or related the targets are do not give any insight into the temporal dimension of an 
acquisition strategy. Such insight may work in the context of individual acquisitions 
but it is a weak foundation for a comprehensive acquisition strategy. 
Also, companies do not operate in a competitive void. External forces such 
as competitive pressures and acquisitions made by competitors also affect them. 
Therefore the hypotheses must also take into account the context of the company if 
they are to provide any insight into what acquisition strategies are best suited for 
different situations. 
In order to avoid these pitfalls and to identify the optimal acquisition 
strategy I constructed my hypotheses to include both the diversification aspect as 
well as the rate of acquisitions. The first three hypotheses answer the broad 
question: “How far should firms diversify their acquisitions in a hypercompetitive 
environment?” The last two hypotheses look to answer more specific questions 
concerning inter-segmental acquisitions such as “Are acquisitions in segments with 
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previous contact better than unknown segments?” and “Does a high rate of entry 
into new segments affect survival and financial performance?” 
In their research on the same data set Laamanen and Keil (unpublished) 
found that a proactive approach to acquisitions actually lowers a firm’s longevity as 
it becomes more attractive as an acquisition target.  However, they did not separate 
between different targets of acquisitions. They also used survival as their only 
metric so leaving open the possibility that those firms that undertake a lot of 
acquisitions and survive may perform better than their competitors. 
3.1 Relatedness of targets 
As presented before, a traditional perspective in the study of acquisition strategies 
has been to look at the level of inter-industry diversification (Hopkins, 1987a; 
Hopkins, 1987b; Lubatkin, 1987; Montgomery & Wilson, 1986; Shelton, 1988; 
Shelton, 1990). As software industry is clearly a multimarket industry (Gimeno & 
Woo, 1996) where intra-industry diversification plays a big part it is necessary to 
use concepts of both intra- and inter-industry diversification to model the possible 
acquisition strategies. 
In an industry landscape consisting of separate segments there are basically 
three different types of acquisition from the point of diversification that a company 
can make. The first option would be to consolidate the current segment by making 
an intra-segment acquisition. Second would be to seek new growth by making an 
inter-segment acquisition in the same industry. The last option would be to make 
an inter-industry acquisition. The three options are graphically presented in Figure 
4. 
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Figure 4: The different acquisition types by level of diversification 
The first option is making an intra-segment acquisition, i.e. acquiring a 
direct competitor. This sort of consolidation-oriented acquisition should improve 
focal company’s financial performance by strengthening its position in the segment 
(Anand & Singh, 1997). Such an acquisition could also be used to cut overcapacity 
in the segment and increase pricing power (Bower, 2001). Although the evidence in 
favor of related acquisitions is not unanimous (Lubatkin, 1987; Seth, 1990), they 
are seen to create value to both acquirers and targets (Singh & Montgomery, 1987; 
Shelton, 1988). 
Hypothesis 1a: Intra-segment acquisitions improve the focal company’s 
financial performance. 
From the complexity theory point-of-view an intra-segment acquisition 
resembles local search on the fitness landscape. The company would already know 
the fitness value of the segment and the target (Levinthal, 1997; March & Simon, 
1995). As local search does not take place unless the fitness value of the new 
location is higher than that of current location, intra-segment acquisitions should 
Segment 2 
Intra-segment 
acquisition 
Segment 1 
Industry 1 
Industry 2 
Segment 3 
Inter-industry 
acquisition 
Inter-segment 
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be beneficial for firm survival. 
Hypothesis 1b: Intra-segment acquisitions improve the focal company’s 
survival rate. 
Moving away from the focal firm’s original segment, the second acquisition 
option would be for the firm to try to diversify its operations by entering a new 
segment in an inter-segment acquisition. Such an acquisition could have one or 
more of several different motives from acquiring R&D capabilities or expansion 
into new markets (Bower, 2001) to the need to seek complementary resources 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Spreading operations in multiple, related segments should 
allow firms to utilize their resources more efficiently. Intra-segment acquisitions 
increase stability of the focal-firm by reducing volatility of cashflows (Anand & 
Singh, 1997). These factors should reflect in an improved financial performance of 
the focal firm. 
Hypothesis 2a: Inter-segment acquisitions improve the focal company’s 
financial performance. 
Depending on how closely related the segments are, inter-segment 
acquisitions can be classified as either local search or exploration depending on 
whether the focal firm has made previous acquisitions from the segment. The 
potential effect of these previous acquisitions on performance and survival is 
examined in hypothesis four.  
In a hypercompetitive industry inter-segmental acquisitions would be 
expected to be strongly present (Levinthal, 1997) as the landscape would be 
constantly changing. The continuous erosion of competitive advantages leads to the 
need for continuous morphing (Rindova and Kotha, 2001). Because firms can not 
rely on walking to top by local search they must engage in long-jumps in order to 
keep and improve their positions. Previous research on the same dataset has 
shown that companies that operated in multiple markets did indeed show better 
longevity (Laamanen & Keil, unpublished). Acquisitions present a faster way of 
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doing this than pure organic growth.  
Hypothesis 2b: Inter-segment acquisitions improve the focal company’s 
survival rate. 
The third option for a company is to seek diversification by entering a totally 
new industry. Traditionally software industry has been more of a target for 
acquisitions from other industries with acquisitions where the acquirer was from 
another industry almost as prevalent as intra-industry acquisitions (Laamanen & 
Keil, unpublished). However, as software firms have grown in size and some of 
them have even entered the traditional bastion of blue-chip stocks - Dow Jones 
industrial Average, the idea of software firms diversifying into other industries is 
starting to look less far-fetched. 
Such inter-industry diversification offers the focal company all the benefits 
of diversification as presented in the literature. These include market power 
advantages, internal market efficiencies and other advantages such as utilizing 
lumpy resources (Palich et al., 2000).  
Inter-industry acquisitions also present a way to reduce competitive 
pressure by lowering multi-market contact with direct competitors (Gimeno & 
Woo, 1996). This enables firms to improve their profits and reduces the risks of 
escalating competition. 
Hypothesis 3a: Inter-industry acquisitions improve the focal company’s 
financial performance. 
For the purposes of this study the relative closeness of the target is not 
relevant so related and un-related industries are handled as the same. In a fitness 
landscape this diversification would be the equivalent of leaping off the map in 
order to locate a better position. This represents the ultimate form of long-jump 
but it would offer the potential advantage of operating in two landscapes with 
different attributes and correlations. Such insurance of operations by acquiring 
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diverse business is an established motive for acquisitions (Anand & Singh, 1997). 
Hypothesis 3b: Inter-industry acquisitions improve the focal company’s 
survival rate. 
3.2 Previous acquisitions in target segment 
In principal inter-segmental acquisitions can be classified as exploration, or 
random search. As the focal company enters outside of its known sphere it lacks the 
intimate knowledge of fitness values that it has in its own segment. This increases 
the potential for erroneous judgment. In M&A process this is the equivalent of 
incorrect pre-deal due diligence. The quality of information gathered in such 
process is often incorrect or blurry as evidenced by the large amount of problems 
that have surfaced only after the deal has been done (Harvey & Lusch, 1995). This 
would reduce the potential positive effects on both financial performance and 
survival. 
The importance of previous acquisition experience in improving acquisition 
performance has been shown (Haleblian et al., 2006). Firms can build new 
strongholds and improve their prospects of survival and profitability by entering 
new segments.   
However, entering new businesses is inherently risky (Bane & Neubauer, 
1981). Firms can reduce the uncertainty associated with an inter-segmental 
acquisition by targeting firms in segments where they have previously made 
acquisitions, irrelevant of what the performance of those acquisitions has been.  
This enables the focal firm to transform the incomputable uncertainty associated 
with the new segment into a computable risk associated with the acquisition of the 
target company.  
When this is not the case and the inter-segmental acquisition is from a 
completely new segment, the financial performance and survival rate of the 
company should be weaker than otherwise. 
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Hypothesis 4a: Inter-segmental acquisitions from segments where the focal 
company has made previous acquisitions will have a bigger effect on focal firm’s 
longevity. 
Hypothesis 4b: Inter-segmental acquisitions from segments where the focal 
company has made previous acquisitions will have a bigger effect on financial 
performance. 
3.3 Expansion rate of the focal company 
If hypothesis two holds, inter-segment acquisitions improve financial performance 
of the focal companies. However, the rate and frequency of acquisitions matter at 
least as much, if not more, for the performance of acquirer than the selection of 
acquisition target with high-rate of acquisitions being detrimental to the acquirer’s 
performance (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). 
Other studies supporting these results show that companies need time to 
integrate acquisitions before making new ones (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; 
Hayward, 2002). Especially for companies that enter new segments, a gradual 
acquisition strategy should be better as it gives time for orderly post-merger 
integration and avoids overwhelming the M&A resources.  This strain on resources 
should also be reflected in the profitability of the company and thus affect its 
financial performance. 
Hypothesis 5a: High rate of expansion into new segments affects financial 
performance negatively. 
From the viewpoint of complexity theory prior acquisitions from another 
segment represent the difference between exploration, a focused search for new 
opportunities and diversification, spreading that can be explained by randomness 
(Eggers & Siggelkow, 2009). While their study shows that both diversification and 
exploration have positive effects on survival, these effects are U-shaped, in that too 
high a rate of either is actually damaging to survival of the focal company. In a 
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similar way, high rate of expansion into new segments should be detrimental to 
survival of the focal company. 
Hypothesis 5b: High rate of expansion into new segments affects survival rate 
negatively. 
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4 Methods and data 
In this section I will explain the methods used in this study as well as describe my 
data. The section includes description of the model used and the tests run on the 
data and the independent, dependent and control variables. 
4.1 Sample 
I selected software industry as a sample for the study. This industry offers a typical 
example of a hypercompetitive industry since the low entry barriers and rapid 
technological change guarantee a large amount of entries and exits (Young et al., 
1996). Software industry also offers ample material for studying acquisition 
strategies since the industry has been exhibiting heavy growth which has lured 
entrants from other industries as well as led to the emergence of big dominating 
players such as Oracle, Microsoft, SAP and Google that have used selective 
acquisitions to strengthen their portfolio. 
The sample was constructed by downloading all the firms with the SIC codes 
7370, 7371, 7372, 7374, 7379 from the Compustat database from the 27-year time 
period of 1980-2006. This includes both firms that offer prepackaged software as 
well as firms offering system design, information technology services or tailored 
programs. The initial sample had a total of 1969 firms of which 1961 were unique. 
Software industry emerged as independent from the computer hardware industry 
only around 1980 (Young et al., 1996) so the sample captures quite well the entire 
development of the industry including its early growth in the 1980s and the 
Internet-fuelled boom of the 1990s with the subsequent bust in the start of the 
millennium. The sample includes all software firms that have been publicly traded 
in the US between 1980 and 2006 The sample is focused in the US but not contains 
also foreign firms as some of them had ADRs trading in the US that were included in 
the sample.  
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The sample was delimited by including only those firms that had achieved 
sales of more than 10 million US dollars at some point in this period. The cutoff-
point was selected because of the information needed for segmenting the firms was 
rather difficult to get for the smallest firms. This left 1497 firms which passed the 
revenue threshold. However, the effect on total figures was rather small as the 
excluded firms represented never more than 0.5 % of annual revenues.  
The development of firms and revenues is pictured in Figure 5. It shows how 
the size of the industry grew rapidly from the 1980 to the end of the 1980s and 
then, after a brief pause, grew almost fourfold in the decade from 1989 to 1999. At 
the same time the number of firms grew along a classical S-curve with slow grow in 
the first 20 years and then a fast leap from more than 100 to more than 500 
hundred under 10 years. The bursting of the dot-com bubble led to a rapid decline 
in the amount of firms although total revenues decreased only slightly and 
temporarily. Overall, the figure resembles that of a maturing industry with its 
initial take-off followed by a period of rapid growth and the eventual consolidation 
and decline in firms.  
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Figure 5: Development of amount of firms and revenues 1970-2006 (N=1497) 
The same trend is also evident in Figure 6 that shows the entries and exits of 
sample firms in the time period. Before 1990 exits were relatively rare and only 
once exceeded the amount of entries. In mid-nineties the number of entries took 
suddenly off only to fall at the turn of the millennium when exits also took over 
entries and erased most of the increase in the number of firms of the last years. 
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Figure 6: Entries and exits of firms 1970-2006 
In order to evaluate the effects of acquisitions the dataset was combined 
with mergers and acquisitions data from the Thomson SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions database. The sample includes all completed acquisitions from 1980 to 
2006 where the target was an American firm, the acquirer had a SIC code of 737x 
and the acquisition resulted in majority ownership. This yielded a total of 10 954 
acquisitions of which 3171 were made by companies that passed the threshold of 
10 million dollars in revenues. 
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4.2 Segmentation 
In order to model the software industry as a fitness landscape and to locate each 
firm in its proper place I had to find a way of categorizing the different firms. The 
most feasible way of doing this was to classify the firms into segments based on 
their principal business. The classification included in the SIC codes was too rough 
to be of any use so I had to look for other classification systems. 
As I was unable to find a reliable classification system for the companies I 
had to create the segments ourselves. On this I relied on public information 
available from company reports, newspapers e.g. Business Week and financial 
information providers such as Yahoo! Finance. I tried to identify the principal 
business of the company and locate it according to that. New companies were 
initially tried to locate in existing segments but new segments were added as 
needed. No company was give more than one segment, which creates some 
limitations for the research that are handled in more detail in the last chapter.  
Some of the segments are more functional like Business Process 
Management Software, some reflect the industry the company is serving like 
Healthcare Software and Services and Financial Software and Services, some like 
Information Technology Services are fairly general. There are also two segments 
namely Hi-tech manufacturing and Holding company that are not strictly connected 
to software industry. These were still included as to keep the sample 
representative. Altogether there are 27 segments. Largest of these both in number 
of firms and revenues was the information technology services segment with 91 
firms in 2006 and revenue of 177 billion dollars. On average a segment had 16 
firms and revenue of 16 billion in 2006 but medians for these measures were 8 and 
6, respectively. A complete list of the segments with examples of companies is 
presented in Table 2. For 41 of the firms there was not sufficient information about 
their business that they could have been segmented. These firms were 
subsequently removed from the sample with 1456 firms remaining.  
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Table 2: List of the segments with example companies 
Segment Examples 
Business intelligence Business Objects, Cognos 
Business process management software Oracle, SAP 
Communications software and services Lucent Technologies, Equant 
Defence contracting services Saic, Titan 
Device software optimization 
Wind River Systems, Mercury Computer 
Systems 
Educational applications Riverdeep Group, Davidson & Associates 
Engineering software Structural Dynamics Research, Ask Group 
Entertainment software and services Widerthan Co, Mp3.Com 
Financial software and services First Data, Fiserv 
Gaming software Electronic Arts, Konami 
Graphics software Silicon Graphics, Adobe Systems 
Healthcare software and services Cerner, HLTH 
Hi-tech manufacturing Applera, Continuum 
Holding company Emvelco, Halo Technology Holdings 
Information technology resource management 
software Compuware, BMC Software 
Information technology services IBM, Fujitsu 
Internet marketing services Web.com, JL Halsey 
Internet platform Disney Internet Group, Ebay 
Internet search engines Google, Yahoo 
Internet service provider Level 3 communications, Earthlink 
Location based software and services Navteq, AT Road 
Network management software International Network Services, Netiq 
Network security software Symantec, Verisign 
Operating systems software Microsoft, Wang Labs 
Storage management software Veritas Software, Ashton-Tate 
Travel software and services Sabre holdings, Galileo International 
Virtualization and remote access of applications Citrix Systems, Savvis 
Figure 7 shows the development of sales by segment for the classified firms. 
It is evident from the figure that information technology services is clearly the 
biggest segment with sales starting from over 90 percent in the early years and 
averaging almost half in the last decade. This may be partly due to the fact that the 
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definition of the segment is rather ambiguous in comparison with some of the other 
segments. 
Figure 7: Development of sales by segment 1970-2006 (n=1456) 
The same dominance is evident to a lesser extent in Figure 8 which shows 
the number of firms in each segment for the research period.  Here the share of 
firms in information technology services starts from 60 percent of the total and 
ends with little more than one fifth in 2006. So, most of the growth in the number of 
firms during the dot-com boom did not actually come from the segment, although it 
had clearly the biggest share of revenues.  
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Figure 8: Number of firms by segment: 1970-2006 
4.3 Acquisitions 
All the acquisitions were categorized also by the segment of the target and the 
acquirer. Here, the sources were the SDC database itself as well as the Internet 
resources that had been utilized in categorizing the initial sample. All the 
companies outside the software industry were lumped together as “other industry” 
as there was initially no differentiation between different industries. Of the 3171 
acquisitions the segment of the target company could not be identified in 88 cases.  
These were left out and the sample was cut to 3083 acquisitions. Of these 
acquisitions only 1 829 had any information concerning the deal value and only 
772 had listed revenue of the target company. This lack of information places limits 
on the available variables when building the model. 
Of the three different types of acquisitions that were identified in the 
previous section most common were intra-segment acquisitions that presented 1 
Methods and data
 
   
44 
   
 
 
0 %
20 %
40 %
60 %
80 %
100 %
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Inter-segment
Inter-industry
Intra-segment
Total acquisitions
504 cases or 48,8 percent of the total number. Inter-segment acquisitions were the 
second biggest group with 1 163 acquisitions or 37,7 percent. Inter-industry 
acquisitions made up the rest with 416 cases or 13,5 percent.  Figure 9 shows how  
Figure 9: Share of different acquisitions and the total amount of acquisitions 
the share of different acquisitions has stayed relatively stable over the last decade 
even though the annual amount of all acquisitions has more than doubled. Excluded 
from the figure are those acquisitions that where acquisition year was not 
identified or it fell outside the scope of the study (i.e. 2007). 
In order to model the organizational search practiced by the companies I 
mapped all the acquisitions where the companies were participating, either as an 
acquirer or a target. Figure 10 presents the industry as a network bound by inter-
segmental acquisitions. The size of each segment is proportional to the proportion 
of intra-segment acquisitions of total acquisitions by companies in that segment. 
The strength of the lines connecting the segments highlights the amount of 
acquisitions between those two segments as a proportion of total acquisitions by 
companies in those segments. The small size of the “other industry” is due to the 
fact that no acquirers were listed in that segment so consequently there were no 
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intra-segment acquisitions either. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Proportions of intra- and inter-segment and inter-industry acquisitions by 
segment 
Conceptually, the different segments of the software industry are mapped as 
different locations in the fitness landscape of software industry. The fitness of the 
company is a function of the different segments in which it is undertaking 
acquisitions and the interactions between those segments. The fitness of the 
segments is defined as the level of survival and growth the companies in these 
segments have. It is assumed that the companies can operate in all segments and 
thus the payoffs of the segments are identical to all. 
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4.4 Dependent variables 
Studies into value created by acquisitions have usually tended to rely on stock-
market measures by estimating abnormal stock returns caused by the merger 
announcement (Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Shelton, 1988; Seth, 
1990). The use of such measures relies on the assumption that the short-term 
reaction of the stock market is a good indicator of the long-term value created by 
the deal. As this study looks at long-term survival and performance as a function of 
acquisition strategy instead of focusing on single acquisitions, such measures were 
not applicable for this study. Instead I have constructed two measures one of which 
tracks the survival of the focal firm and the other focusing on the focal firm’s 
financial performance. The benefit of such a dual approach is that as survival is the 
primary objective of the firm itself, an exit by acquisition may actually create more 
value to the shareholders of the target firm. 
Firm survival has been used previously in several studies on population 
ecology that have a research period of several decades ((Agarwal, Sarkar, & 
Echamebadi, 2002; Dobrev & Carroll, 2003; Suarez & Utterback, 1995). It is an 
especially crucial measure in an industry with relatively low average lifespan. In 
this sample the realized average age of existence after the IPO was only 6,9 years. 
When still existing firms were taken into account this rose to 9,0 years. 
Reasons for stopping operations as an independent firm vary by firm. Most 
common in this sample was being the target of an acquisition. Other possibilities 
include bankruptcy, liquidation or a LBO. In this study the focus was on exits either 
by bankruptcy, both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code, or 
acquisition. These were also the most numerous reasons for exit representing 653 
of the 822 or 79 per cent of the cases where cause of exit was identified. 
As survival may be an insufficient measure in itself, I also measured the 
financial performance of the firm. Here the problem lies in determining what part 
of performance is affected by acquisitions, especially when deal value and 
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information concerning the size of target is lacking in so many cases. 
Measures of acquisition performance can focus either on financial 
performance from the external, shareholders point of view or from the internal 
perspective of the firm. Both ways have their benefits and drawbacks. 
When measuring acquisition performance from shareholder perspective, 
most popular measure has been abnormal short-term changes in stock-prices 
(Anand, 1997; Bower, 2001; Hayward, 2002; Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Lubatkin, 
1987; Singh, 1987; Shelton, 1988; Seth, 1990; Swaminathan, 2008). The problem 
with this measure is that it reflects only short-term effects of the acquisition 
announcement. In order to evaluate the long-term effectiveness of acquisition 
strategies it would be necessary to use long-term stock market measures. Although 
such measures have been used in studies on acquisition performances by e.g. Junna 
(2008), it is not clear how well these measures capture the effect of acquisitions on 
stock prices. 
Another stockholder measure would have been earnings per share or EPS 
that has long been an important measure of business performance. However, the 
intense attention investors and analysts are paying to this number is leading 
managers to routinely round-up their numbers in order to be able to announce 
forecast-beating earnings (Das & Zhang, 2003). 
Internal measures include ratios such as ROE and ROA that have also been 
used to measure acquisition performance (Hopkins, 1987a). These measures were 
not used since there are intrinsic differences between industries in their ROE levels 
(Hall & Weiss, 1967). So, firms making inter-industry acquisitions from industries 
with lower natural levels of ROE would be unduly punished.  
Another argument against using ratios as measures was that, as most of the 
firms were expanding from a relatively small asset base, there would be big 
variance in the ratios. Profit margins were discarded for the same reason, as 
companies would usually have a period of high losses in relation to their sales 
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before, if ever, becoming profitable. 
Instead of a measure based on stock price, I used the EBIT (profit before 
interest and taxes less extraordinary items) as a measure of profitability. The 
motivation for this was that although firms may undertake acquisitions for several 
motives as suggested by Trautwein (1990), these acquisitions can create 
shareholder value only if they result in increased profit. EBIT is broadly similar to 
the pretax-operating cash flow that has also been used to measure acquisition 
success (Anand & Singh, 1997), especially in an industry with low tangible assets 
that would need to be depreciated. 
4.5 Independent variables 
The focus of this study is the effect of acquisition strategies on survival rate and 
financial performance of the focal firm in a hypercompetitive industry. In order to 
differentiate between the different strategies I had to develop separate, extensive 
variables concerning individual acquisitions and their interactions. 
Intra-segment acquisitions: These represent a large share of the acquisitions 
as companies tried to consolidate their position within the segments. They were 
measured by calculating the average number of acquisitions within the segment 
during the focal and two previous years 
Inter-segment acquisitions: This type of acquisition was almost as common 
as intra-segment ones and they are vital for firms that try to search for new 
locations in the industry landscape. These were measured by taking the average 
number of acquisitions from other segments in the software industry during the 
focal and two previous years 
Inter-industry acquisitions: These acquisitions were not that numerous but 
they represent an important strategy of long-jumping to an entirely new industry. 
They were similarly measured by taking the average number of acquisitions from 
other industries during the focal and two previous years 
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Entering new segments: When a firm enters a segment other than its own, it 
takes considerably more risks.  These risks should then reflect on its financial 
performance. This is measured by creating a dummy variable that gets a value of 1 
when an inter-segmental acquisition is from a segment where the focal firm has not 
made previous acquisitions.  
Rate of entering new segments: A high rate of acquisitions is generally 
adversely linked to financial performance since resources for integrating new 
companies are limited and not easily divided (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). In a similar 
manner, it is expected that expansion into new segments would eat management 
resources and thus be inversely linked to financial performance. This is measured 
by calculating the amount of new segments the firm has entered divided by the age 
of the firm. 
4.6 Control variables 
When undertaking acquisitions companies must pay attention not only to their 
own operations but also to the activities of their competitors. Mergers and 
acquisitions are not only driven by internal business logic, they are also affected by 
M&A patterns in the industry and in the supply chain (Öberg & Holmström, 2006). 
High levels of acquisition activity, or merger waves as they are sometimes called, 
tend to produce competing bids, drive prices higher and thus reduce the value 
available to the acquirer (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 
2004). 
In order to avoid being trapped in a merger wave with increasing prices and 
diminishing returns firms can look for segments with relatively low rate of 
acquisition activity. Wernerfelt (1984) suggests that when operating in an 
imperfect market such as the market for acquisitions, firms can obtain best value 
by basing their purchases on their most rare resource where they face the lowest 
level of competition. This is especially important in inter-segmental acquisitions 
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where firms are more likely to target complimentary resources to build an effective 
bundle instead of just consolidating their existing resource bundle by 
supplementary acquisitions from the same segment. So, inter-segmental 
acquisitions from a segment with low level of acquisition activity should create 
better value than others. 
Acquisition activity of the target segment: Acquirers presumably create the 
highest value when they can base their acquisitions on their most rare resource 
and make acquisitions where there are few or no competitive bidders (Wernerfelt, 
1984). This is measured by calculating the annual average of acquisitions in the 
target segment based on the amount of acquisitions in the previous three years. In 
cases where a company has made inter-segment acquisitions from several 
segments in one year, an average of all the segments is calculated. 
Survival rate in the focal firm’s segment: Laamanen and Keil (forthcoming) 
found in their study on the same sample that firms in segments with high number 
of inter-segment and inter-industry acquisitions exhibit lower longevity. Since 
exiting firms include all acquisition targets as well as firms going bankrupt or 
liquidating business, it is reasonable to assume that low survival rate would reflect 
negatively on the firm’s survival rate as well. The survival rate is calculated by 
dividing all the firms that exit the segment in a given year by the number of firms in 
that segment at the beginning of the year. The focal firm is left out from both the 
denominator as well as the nominator in order to reduce multicollinearity when 
calculating survival rates. 
Growth of the focal firm’s segment: Firms in a segment that is growing very 
rapidly should exhibit higher survival rate and better firm performance. Growth of 
the segment can also be used to measure the overall fitness levels in the segment 
that should be reflected in the relative popularity of local search versus random 
search. Local search is more likely to take place in the later periods as firms have 
acquired relatively high fitness levels where there is only a low probability of 
Methods and data
 
   
51 
   
 
 
making a long-jump to a location with high fitness value (Levinthal, 1997). The 
sales growth of the segment is used as an inverse proxy of segment life-cycle. It is 
measured by calculating the sales growth in the segment during the focal year as 
percentage of previous year’s sales. 
Concentration of market share: A segment with high concentration of market 
share lowers the longevity of the focal firm significantly (Laamanen & Keil, 
forthcoming). In a similar way it should also lower the financial performance of the 
focal firm. This concentration is measured by calculating the share of sales that the 
three biggest firms have in the segment of the focal firm. 
Market share of the focal firm: A firm with high market share should be able 
to survive better and achieve higher performance than its competitors. The results 
are controlled for this by calculating the share of sales the focal firm commands in 
its primary segment. 
Deal size: The size of the deal in relation to the market value of the firm is an 
important factor in how much the focal firm’s performance is affected. This is 
calculated by dividing the deal size by the focal firm’s market value at the end of 
previous year. Unfortunately, deal value was reported in only 1 834 cases. As the 
missing cases were most likely those that were so small that the acquirer doesn’t 
have to make an announcement, the absence of more than 1 000 acquisitions could 
have created a bias in the results. In order to avoid this, this variable was used in 
only one of the models.  
Dot-com boom: In order to control for the fact that during the dot-com boom 
in the late 1990s stock valuations reached unsustainable heights that also led to 
depressed acquirer returns (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). This was also a period of a 
dramatic business cycle that led to wide distortions of capital (Callahan & Garrison, 
2003). In order to control for this fact I added a dummy variable that gets a value of 
1 for the years 1996-2000 and a zero for other years. This corresponds roughly 
with the time from Netscape’s IPO in August 1995 to the stock market correction 
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that began in March 2000. 
Profitability: When testing for effects on survival, it was important to take 
into account the initial profitability of the firm. The effects of profitability on 
survival can be two-fold. High profitability decreases the possibility of bankruptcy 
thus improving survival prospects (Karels & Prakash, 1987). On the other hand, 
more profitable companies are likely to be acquired (Barnes, 1990). So the effect of 
profitability on survival should depend on what is the relative importance of 
bankruptcy and acquisitions as causes of exit. Here profitability was measured as 3-
year average of EBIT-margin, or earnings before taxes and interest divided by net 
sales. As EBIT was already accounted for in testing effects on financial 
performance, the variable was used only in survival analysis. 
4.7 Model 
Since the hypotheses used two different dependent variables, namely survival and 
financial performance, there was also a need for two different models. For testing 
the hypotheses 1b-5b that measured firm survival, a Cox proportional hazard 
model (Cox, 1972; Cox & Oakes, 1984) was used. A semi-parametric version of the 
model was chosen, since this version makes no strict assumptions about the 
baseline hazard function that could yield biased estimates of the effects that 
covariates have on the hazard rate (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1995). This sort of model 
may as well be used with time-varying as well as time-independent covariates (Cox, 
1972). Another benefit of the proportional model is that it allows for the fact that 
although events are recorded on an annual basis, they may take place any time 
during the year. The formal regression model has a form of  
)}('exp{)( 0 tXhth          (1) 
Where h0 (t) is the baseline hazard function, β is a vector consisting of 
regression coefficients to be estimated and X is the covariates vector. The 
proportional hazards model makes no assumptions about the baseline hazard 
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vector h0 (t). The Cox’s partial likelihood estimator provides an effective way of 
estimating β without making any estimates concerning the baseline hazard. Thus 
the baseline hazard is not reliant on the covariates that are used in the model 
(Laamanen & Keil, forthcoming). This sort of estimation method for firm survival 
has been widely used in the literature including the studies of Mata et al. (1995) 
and Shane & Foo (1999). 
For testing hypotheses 1a-5a on how acquisitions affect profitability, I used 
an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) model. The dataset is a typical example 
of panel data with a large number of groups with rather few observations in each 
group. For such a dataset an OLS model allows to control for both within-unit 
effects as well as between-unit effects as long as the data is homoscedastic and 
autocorrelation is not present (Greene, 2000). The OLS estimator can be 
formulated as  
iiii iy   X        (2) 
where i is the number of the observation α is the unit-specific effect and β 
the time-specific effect. 
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5 Results 
In this section I will present the results obtained from the data as well as the 
potential falsification of the hypotheses. For purposes of clarity the section is 
divided in two sub-sections. The first will present the results on hypotheses 1b-5b 
that concerned effects of acquisition strategies on survival of the focal firm along 
with some robustness analysis of the results. The second section presents the 
results on the effects that acquisition strategy has on the financial performance, in 
this case profitability, of the focal firm. 
First I present some descriptive statistics of the data in addition to those 
already presented in the previous chapter. Table 3 shows the correlations between 
the different variables. The risk of multicollinearity is fairly low as the correlations 
between dependent and independent variables are not statistically significant. The 
small sample is explained by the lack of information concerning deal sizes. 
However, leaving deal size out of the correlation table does not change the results 
markedly, although the amount of observations rises to 10 489. 
Table 3: Correlation between the variables 
N=1362 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Acquisition activity 1             
2 Survival -.04 1            
3 Segment Growth .00 .08 1           
4 Concentration .04 -.06 .07 1          
5 Market Share .03 .08 .05 .22 1         
6 Deal Size -.01 .03 .00 -.02 .00 1        
7 EBIT margin -.04 .05 .00 -.01 .06 .00 1       
8 Boom .19 .06 .03 -.11 -.06 .05 -.04 1      
9 Intra Segment -.13 -.05 -.02 -.09 .01 .01 .02 .08 1     
10 Inter Segment .36 .00 .04 .21 .45 .03 .03 .02 -.09 1    
11 Inter Industry -.08 .05 .00 .00 .06 .00 -.02 .02 .18 .03 1   
12 Enter New .20 .02 .06 .08 .04 .02 -.10 .17 -.23 .21 -.05 1  
13 Rate Of Entry .18 -.01 .05 .12 .06 .00 -.03 .18 -.04 .41 .13 .45 1 
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More descriptive statistics of the variables are shown in Table 4. There it 
becomes clear that even in a hypercompetitive industry acquisitions are the 
exception, rather than the norm, as the mean of the three-year average of 
acquisitions is no more than 0.09 for acquisitions from the same segment and even 
less for other types of acquisitions. Also more than three fourths of the acquisitions 
where value is known are valued at less than 50 million. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
5.1 Effects of acquisitions on survival 
As a first step to test my hypotheses on the effect of acquisitions on survival, I 
created a base model with all the control variables in it to test for their significance.  
The results of this model are shown in Table 5. The problem is that the limited 
amount of observations on deal sizes reduces the reliability of the results. The 
model with deal size left out yields a much larger sample with much higher 
statistical significance.  The results show that as expected, survival of other firms in 
the segment has a big positive effect on the survival of the focal firm itself. 
Likewise, the market share of focal firm in the segment has a positive effect on 
survival. Other controlling variables including acquisition activity in the target 
firms segment, segment growth, concentration of the segment and the dot-com 
Variable N Mean SD P1 P25 Median P75 P99 Min Max 
           
Acquisition 
activity 12174 1.12 6.28 0 0 0 0 36.5 0 72 
Survival 11756 0.92 0.08 0.65 0.88 0.93 0.98 1 0 1 
Segment 
Growth 12174 0.24 1.6 -0.43 0.03 0.11 0.26 1.38 -0.97 26.64 
Concen-
tration 12174 0.67 0.19 0 0.52 0.69 0.81 1 0 1 
Market 
Share 12174 0.05 0.14 0 0 0 0.03 0.87 0 1 
Deal Size 1447 107 546 0 0 10 44 1884 0 11881 
EBIT 
margin 12013 -2.92 108 -18.51 -0.25 0 0.09 0.36 
-10 
400    0.73 
IntraSeg 12174 0.09 0.35 0 0 0 0 1.33 0 13 
InterSeg 12174 0.07 0.27 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.67 
InterInd 12174 0.03 0.15 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 4 
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boom have negative effects, even though these are statistically insignificant. 
Table 5: Results for a Cox proportional hazards model with only control variables (*=p<0.1, 
**=p<0.05 and ***=p<0.01) 
VARIABLES base base less 
Deal Size 
Survival -1.944** -3.168*** 
Acquisition activity 0.00323 0.0043 
Segment Growth 0.00403 0.000185 
Concentration 0.981* 0.0713 
Market Share -1.534** -1.779*** 
Boom 0.117 0.117 
EBIT margin -0.000163 0.00872 
Deal Size -0.0001  
   
Observations 1340 10172 
Spells 1340 10172 
Number of firms 490 1350 
Events 136 958 
Chi2 13.95 109.4 
Next I started to test my hypotheses, namely hypotheses 1a-5a. The results 
of these are shown in Table 6.  Hypothesis 1a predicted that intra-segment 
acquisitions would have a positive effect on the focal firm’s longevity. 
Unfortunately, with 95 per cent confidence level the opposite holds, and intra-
segment acquisitions in fact increase the hazard rate for firms. The same holds for 
inter-segment acquisitions where hypothesis 2a predicted that firms that engage in 
those would have a bigger chance of survival. The effect of inter-segment 
acquisitions is negative with p<0.05 and the co-efficient is even bigger than in 
intra-segment acquisitions. 
Table 6: The Cox proportional hypothesis model test for hypotheses 1a-4a and 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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VARIABLES base h1a h2a h3a h4a h5a 
       
Survival -3.642*** -3.597*** -3.617*** -3.639*** -3.586*** -3.535*** 
Acquisition 
activity 
0.00745* 0.00652 0.00242 0.00772* 0.00161 0.000836 
Segment Growth -0.00429 -0.00427 -0.00423 -0.00438 -0.00470 -0.00364 
Concentration -0.0884 -0.0627 -0.0977 -0.0923 -0.0850 -0.0640 
Market Share -1.288** -1.328*** -1.455*** -1.273** -1.491*** -1.369*** 
Boom 0.0795 0.0734 0.0810 0.0804 0.0784 0.0827 
EBIT margin 0.00872 0.00851 0.00864 0.00875 0.00865 0.00838 
IntraSeg  0.150**     
InterSeg   0.288**  0.262*  
InterInd    -0.170   
interSeg_x_ 
Enter New 
    0.246  
Enter New     -0.0137  
Rate Of Entry      0.514*** 
       
Observations 9971 9971 9971 9971 9971 9971 
Spells 9971 9971 9971 9971 9971 9971 
Number of firms 1347 1347 1347 1347 1347 1347 
Events 792 792 792 792 792 792 
Chi2 89.09 93.21 93.30 89.61 95.35 101.4 
Hypothesis 3a predicted that inter-industry acquisitions would have a 
positive effect on focal firm’s longevity. The coefficient for inter-industry 
acquisitions is negative, thus indicating a positive effect on longevity, but the effect 
is hardly statistically significant.  So, inter-industry acquisitions don’t seem to have 
much effect on survival. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 4a stated that firms that make inter-segmental acquisitions into 
segments where they have no previous experience would experience less positive 
effects on their survival rate. The fifth column of the table shows that this may hold, 
as the interaction term between entering a new segment and making an inter-
segmental acquisition is positive, although not significant statistically. 
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Hypothesis 5a predicted that a rapid rate of entry into new segments would 
lower the focal firm’s longevity. There is a positive coefficient which is also 
statistically significant at 99 per cent, so this hypothesis is supported by the data. 
So, firms that entered new segments rapidly were more likely to fail. 
In order to test the robustness of the results I made several runs while 
varying the model slightly by leaving out certain control variables or changing the 
time frames for the independent variables. The results are presented in Table 7.  
The columns present different models built for the hypotheses 1a-5a in ascending 
order. The first three rows present the results of different time frames for 
acquisition activity, namely 3, 1 and 5 years. The results from these are not 
inconsistent in themselves, in that all models have positive coefficients for both 
intra-segment and inter-segment acquisitions. However, the statistical significance 
of the results varies so that inter-segmental acquisitions have a negative effect with 
5 % C.I with both 1 and 5-year models, whereas three year model has a statistically 
significant effect for only intra-segmental acquisitions. The rate of entry has a 
consistent negative effect on survival for all three time frames, with the only 
difference being between 1 and 5 per cent confidence levels. 
Table 7: Results of hypotheses with different models 
Model type/ Effect on 
survival (+=negative, 
Underlined=p<0.01) 
IntraSe
g 
InterSe
g 
InterIn
d Enter New Rate Of Entry 
Time periods       
3yr  +    + 
1yr   +   + 
5yr   +   + 
Partial models       
3yr-AcqAct  +    + 
3yr-Survival  +    + 
3yr-SegGrowth  +    + 
3yr-
Concentration  +    + 
3yr-Boom  + +   + 
3yr-
MarketShare      + 
1yr-Survival   +   + 
1yr-AcqAct   +   + 
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1yr-SegGrowth   +   + 
1yr-
Concentration   +   + 
1yr-
MarketShare      + 
1yr-Boom   +   + 
5yr-Survival   +   + 
5yr-AcqAct   +   + 
5yr-SegGrowth   +   + 
5yr-
Concentration   +   + 
5yr-
MarketShare      + 
5yr-Boom   +   + 
Square terms       
3yrSqr&3yr  + +   + 
1yrSqr&1yr      + 
5yrSqr&5yr   /+   + 
The following rows show the results for each of the different time frames 
with one control variable left out. The results do not change much. In fact the only 
significant changes happen when market share of the focal firm is omitted. This 
implies that the success of acquisition strategy is strongly dependent on firm size in 
general and the market position that the focal firm has in its own segment in 
particular. However, there is no moderated effect between market share and 
acquisitions as the table on testing interdependence between market share and 
acquisition activity in the Appendixes shows.   
Omitting the dot-com boom from the model changes the results slightly for 
the three year time frame, as the negative effect of inter-segmental acquisitions 
become statistically significant. With other time frames any such changes do not 
occur, which could imply that end of the nineties were a period when acquisitions 
from other segments were more common and thus their negative effect on survival 
was more limited. 
The bottom three rows simply show the results of a test for possible 
curvilinear effects that acquisitions might have on survival. These are tested by 
adding a square-term of acquisition activity in the model. However, the results are 
fairly similar and in no cases do both the single term and the square term show 
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statistically significant effects. 
To sum up the results of the test, they quite clearly prove hypotheses 1b and 
2b false. This means that intra- and inter-segment acquisitions in fact lower 
survival rates of the focal firms. On hypothesis 3b, namely the effect of inter-
industry acquisitions, the results are inconclusive. This is also the case with 
hypothesis 4b, how entering new segment affects inter-segmental acquisitions. The 
strongest results are for the rate of entry into new segments that has clearly 
negative effect on survival, regardless of time frame. This is in support of 
hypothesis 5b. The coefficients for all the independent variables are still markedly 
smaller than for the market share and survival rate, so acquisitions affect survival 
less than focal firm’s initial position and competitive dynamics in the segment. 
5.2 Additional analysis on acquisitions and survival 
As the results of survival analysis contradicted most of the initial hypotheses, there 
was a clear need for additional exploratory research in order to explain the 
difference between assumptions and results. The following three chapters look at 
how different methods of exit affect the results, as well as whether results are 
affected by financial performance of the focal company or the ongoing phase in the 
industry life-cycle. The chapters are based on post-hoc analysis of the data and 
earlier research on the subject. 
5.3 Acquisitions versus bankruptcies 
Bankruptcy and becoming acquired are very different outcomes for both the 
managers and the shareholders. Whereas bankruptcy is usually the end of a longer 
process during which the company may have tried acquisitions as a method of 
relocating in better position with higher fitness value, acquisitions can happen 
rather unexpectedly. Becoming acquired does not mean failure for the company in 
the sense that bankruptcy does and it is therefore not self-evident why acquisitions 
should have a similar effect on the possibilities of the focal company ending 
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bankrupt as on its likelihood of being acquired. 
In order to see how the results depending on whether the cause of exit was 
bankruptcy or acquisition the dataset was split by the method of exit. The results of 
the two separate sets are shown in Table 8. The results on bankruptcies are only 
suggestive as there were only 38 such events during the period of study. They were 
also tested for rare events logistic regression (King & Zeng, 2001) but the results 
were similar as with an ordinary Cox regression. 
Table 8: Effect of variables on survival depending on method of exit 
Variable / Effect on survival (+=negative, 
Underlined=p<0.01) Acquisitions Bankruptcies 
Survival -  
Acquisition activity   
Segment Growth 
  
Concentration   
Market Share -  
Boom +  
EBIT margin +  
IntraSeg +  
InterSeg  + 
InterInd   
interSeg_x_ 
Enter New   
Rate Of Entry +  
 There are clear differences between how different variables affect the 
likelihood of the event occurring. Whereas with bankruptcies only inter-segmental 
acquisitions have a statistically effect, acquisitions are affected by dot-com boom, 
profitability, intra-segment acquisitions and the rate of entry into new segments, all 
of which have a negative effect and market share and survival which have a 
positive effect on survival. Most significant are the effects of survival and dot-com 
boom that are both significant at 1 per cent level, with the rest being significant at 5 
per cent level. 
 The connection between high profitability and increased likelihood of 
becoming acquired support earlier research by Barnes (1990). More profitable 
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companies offer better prospects for acquisition as they are shown to have a viable 
business with less need for a laborious turnaround process. However, market share 
that is also an indirect measure of size has a negative effect as bigger companies 
have less prospective acquirers. 
 The effect of acquisitions on likelihood of becoming acquired suggests that 
firms that try to increase their market share in their focal segment actually increase 
their attractiveness as an acquisition target. Earlier research has shown that 
proactive approach to acquisitions did not affect the effects of inter-segmental 
acquisitions on survival but there was no separation between different types of 
acquisitions by the focal firms (Laamanen & Keil, unpublished). 
5.4 Effects of acquirer’s financial position 
Acquisitions consume both financial and managerial resources of the 
acquirer (Wernerfelt, 1984; Matsusaka, 2001). As managerial resources are hard to 
quantify, it is therefore necessary to look closer into how the availability of 
financial resources affects the effects that acquisitions have on survival rates. It 
would be expected that companies with more resources available would be able to 
better implement the integration process and thus have smaller negative effects 
from acquisitions. 
In order to see whether there were differences between acquirers 
depending on the amount of financial resources they had available I created two 
new dummy variables that take into account both the current availability of 
financial resources as well as the capability of the company to generate new 
resources from its existing business.  
The variables were constructed by calculating the annual median of EBIT 
margin and equity ratio for each segment. EBIT margin was chosen as it was used 
already in the study as a measure of profitability. It also measures the ability of the 
company to transform sales into profit and generating resources to build new 
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businesses. Equity ratio was taken as a measure of solvency and because 
integrating new acquisitions may eat up equity in the first years after the 
acquisition. Each segment was then divided by two and the two sides were tested 
separately for both variables. There was also a third variable that grouped the 
firms in three groups: those that had both variables better than the segment 
median, those that had both lower than the median, and the rest. The last group 
was the biggest containing 314 of the total of 638 exits in the set that were 
identifies as acquisitions or bankruptcies. 
The results of these tests are shown in Table 9.  There are marked 
differences between the top and the bottom half in both equity ratio and EBIT 
margin. The most significant is what kind of effect intra- and inter-segment 
acquisitions have. For the better firms, intra-segment acquisitions have a 
significant negative effect on survival, whereas inter-segment acquisitions have no 
effect. For firms with lower financial strength the effect is the exact opposite. Also, a 
high rate of entry into new segments seems to have a stronger effect on less 
profitable firms. 
Table 9: Effect of financial position of the acquirer 
Variable / Effect on 
survival (+=negative, 
Underlined=p<0.01) Equity ratio EBIT margin Both 
 Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom Middle 
Survival - -  -   - 
Acquisition activity    +    
Segment Growth        
Concentration        
Market Share    -    
Boom + + + + + + + 
EBIT margin        
IntraSeg +  +  +   
InterSeg  +  +    
InterInd        
interSeg_x_ 
Enter New        
Rate Of Entry + +  +  + + 
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The differences suggest that companies with bigger resources are better 
positioned to gain foothold in new markets. The major threat to those companies 
seems to lie in acquiring too strong a position in their focal segment. The results are 
not separated according to the method of exit but as was noted earlier, intra-
segment acquisitions increased the likelihood of becoming acquired, which 
suggests that intra-segment acquisitions by financially strong companies make 
them a good target for new entrants planning to enter the market.  
On the other hand, weaker companies are more affected by inter-segmental 
acquisitions and the effect of entering new segments at a high rate is more 
significant which suggests that entering new segments strains their resources and 
increases their risks of becoming victims of bankruptcy or acquisition. 
As Figure 11 shows, companies that entered bankruptcy and those were 
acquired in a weaker financial condition differed quite substantially from those that 
had a strong financial position when they were acquired. The figure plots the 
median EBIT margin and equity ratio for each of the groups for the three year 
period before their exits. The main difference lies in the fact that the strongest 
acquired companies were profitable for the whole period and were thus able to 
increase their equity ratio. At the time of acquisition they were in quite good 
financial position with median EBIT margin of 11 per cent and equity ratio of 79 
per cent. 
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Figure 11: EBIT margin and equity ratio of the exited companies in 3-year period before the 
exit 
The bankrupt and acquired companies with weak position on the other 
hand lost money constantly and were unable to get sufficient new investments 
from their owners which led to a decreasing equity ratio. At the point of exit their 
equity ratios are almost identical with 49 and 47 per cent for the acquired and 
bankrupt, respectively. The biggest reason why bankrupt companies did not end up 
acquired lies probably in the fact that their average EBIT margin in the three year 
period preceding the exit was -54 percent, almost four times as big loss as the 
acquired companies’ -14 per cent. 
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Figure 12: Average number of acquisitions annually by company type 
The bigger financial resources of the top acquired companies also enabled 
them to engage in substantially more acquisitions as can be seen from Figure 12. 
The difference between top and bottom companies increased steadily from 0.04 
acquisitions in year T-2 to 0.19 acquisitions in year T. It should be noted that these 
are all mean averages as median figures for all type of acquisitions were zero. The 
sudden leap in acquisitions made by companies heading for bankruptcy in their 
final year is explained by a small number of companies that engaged in several 
acquisitions and thus raised the mean numbers. 
5.5 Differences by time period 
As industries mature, the survival rates as well as the effects of such factors as firm 
size and density, change (Agarwal, Sarkar & Echambadi, 2002). The data indicates 
that during the time period under focus software industry underwent a transition 
from the introductory phase of the industry lifecycle (Porter, 1980) through the 
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growth phase and into the maturing phase.  In order to see how the results change 
based on the life-cycle phase the data was divided into three subsets according to 
these periods. 
The first period spans from 1980 to 1993.  In this period the number of 
firms remained under 400 and number of annual entries exceeded 50 only once. 
This can be seen as the early growth period of the industry. All of the segments 
were already present but only 16 had more than 5 firms in them. The revenues of 
the industry were 172 billion dollars of which 73 per cent was accounted by 
information technology services for. This was also a period with relatively few exits 
as only 65 firms went either bankrupt or were acquired. 
During the growth period from 1994 to 1998 the number of firms in the 
industry more than doubled from 401 to 1 030.  The average growth rate of total 
revenues was 17 per cent and revenues more than doubled to 377 billion dollars.  
The number of exits increased even more than the number of firms with 198 firms 
making an exit. 
Looking at the number of new entries and exits, it is clear that software 
industry entered its mature phase already in 1999. That was the year when 
number of exits exceeded the number of entrants for the first time. By 2006 the 
total number of firms decreased to 434 while revenues had increased to 434 
billion. In this period 382 firms exited the industry by bankruptcy or acquisition 
while the average annual entry rate decreased to 23 from 119. 
Table 10 presents the results of Cox-regression with the three different time 
periods. It is remarkable that during the initial period none of the independent or 
control variables were statistically significant. This is partly duet to the fact that 
there were relatively few exits during that period as well as quite few acquisitions. 
Table 10: Effect of variables on survival depending on time period 
Variable / Effect on survival 
(+=negative, Underlined=p<0.01) 
1980-1993 
(65 events) 
1994-1998 
(198 events) 
1999-2006 
(382 events) 
Survival   - 
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Acquisition activity  +  
Segment Growth   - 
Concentration    
Market Share  - - 
Boom    
EBIT margin    
IntraSeg    
InterSeg  +  
InterInd    
interSeg_x_EnterNew    
Rate Of Entry  + + 
During the dot-com boom period inter-segmental acquisitions rise in 
significance and they as well as entering new segments have a significant negative 
effect on survival. Of the control variables only acquisition activity of target 
segment and market share are significant and their effects are, respectively, 
negative and positive. The negative effect of acquisition activity in target segment, 
inter-segmental acquisitions and high rate of entry suggest the growth phase as a 
period when the choice of where to enter was especially important. The companies 
made many jumps across the industry landscape but they more often than not 
misestimated the fitness value of their target. 
In the last period the only statistically significant independent variable is the 
rate of entry into new segments. Of control variables survival rate, segment growth 
and market share are all significant with a positive effect on survival. In the 
maturity period segments start to consolidate and most important variables 
concern the focal firm’s primary segment. In this phase a segment with high rate of 
survival and fast growth offers a local peak where the firm’s biggest threat comes 
from too rapid expansion into other segments. 
5.6  
5.6  
5.6  
5.6  
5.6  
Effects on acquirer’s financial performance 
The testing of hypotheses concerning the effect different types of acquisitions have 
on the financial performance of focal companies was done by, as described earlier, 
by constructing an OLS regression model. The dependent variable was profitability 
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measured as EBIT. 
Testing EBIT for autocorrelation of first-order with the Woolridge 
autocorrelation test (Woolridge, 2002) yielded F-value of 282.3 which indicates 
high probability (p<0.001) of first-order autocorrelation. As there was evidence of 
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation there was a need to correct for those in 
the model. 
The correction was done by using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors that 
automatically assume the error structure to be autocorrelated, heteroscedastic and 
even correlated across panels (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998).  
The initial results with a complete model and 3 year time frames for both 
EBIT, survival and acquisition activities are presented in Table 11.  The coefficients 
for intra- and inter-segment and inter-industry are positive, which would imply 
that they have a positive effect on financial performance. A high rate of entry seems 
to decrease profit. 
Although, the F-test for between-groups effects are statistically significant at 
p<0.001, the explanatory power of within-effects is quite weak, as the R-square for 
the within variance is only 0.13. The model also contains several insignificant 
variables such as acquisition activity in target segment and segment growth. 
Table 11: Effects of acquisition activity on EBIT (3 year average) 
Regression with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors Numberof obs = 11712  
Method: Fixed-effects 
regression Number of groups = 1378  
Group variable (i): gvkey F( 10, 1377) = 20.49  
maximum lag: 2 Prob >F = 0  
  Within R-squared = 0.1336  
  Drisc/Kraay     
EBIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
IntraSeg 47.56258 12.83988 3.7 0 22.37474 72.75042 
InterSeg 518.508 106.1195 4.89 0 310.3346 726.6813 
InterInd 86.17057 30.10125 2.86 0.004 27.1213 145.2198 
Rate of Entry -378.6393 53.56756 -7.07 0 -483.7222 -273.5564 
Results
 
   
70 
   
 
 
Acquisition 
activity -1.397501 0.872755 -1.6 0.11 -3.109574 0.3145711 
Concentration 132.4307 54.91591 2.41 0.016 24.70283 240.1586 
Market Share 697.7915 248.798 2.8 0.005 209.7274 1185.856 
Survival -220.4644 82.29141 -2.68 0.007 -381.8945 -59.03427 
Boom 37.5091 10.695 3.51 0 16.52885 58.48935 
Segment 
Growth 2.460201 1.417135 1.74 0.083 -0.319776 5.240179 
_cons 77.58267 40.93367 1.9 0.058 -2.716429 157.8818 
Leaving out the all variables that are insignificant at 5 per cent confidence 
level results in a model that is shown in Table 12. This does not change the 
explanatory power of the model markedly, as the R-square actually drops a bit. Also 
the F-value for between-groups effects drops while remaining very significant. The 
signs of coefficients for independent variables are still the same as with the initial 
model. They also seem to support my hypotheses 1a-5a. The signs of the control 
variables are also as expected in that high market share boosts profits. The dot com 
boom boosts profits but the effect is quite small compared to other variables. 
The effect of survival on profits is rather interesting. It seems that a high 
rate of survival in the focal firm’s segment actually reduces profits. This may be 
because total sales of the industry and individual segments were growing most of 
the time, so a reduction in the number of firms leads to reduced competition and 
thus increased profits for the remaining firms.  
Table 12: Effects of acquisition activity on EBIT (3 year average), updated 
Regression with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors Number of obs = 11712  
Method: Fixed-effects 
regression Number of groups = 1378  
Group variable (i): gvkey F(  7, 1377) = 10.86  
maximum lag: 2 Prob > F = 0  
  within  R-squared = 0.1296  
  Drisc/Kraay    
EBIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
IntraSeg 45.88145 12.98215 3.53 0 20.41452 71.34838 
InterSeg 511.1782 102.9594 4.96 0 309.204 713.1523 
InterInd 88.12389 29.48728 2.99 0.003 30.27903 145.9688 
Rate Of Entry -385.5543 53.20708 -7.25 0 -489.93 -281.1786 
Market Share 633.4596 225.0334 2.81 0.005 192.0143 1074.905 
Survival -185.3106 74.53592 -2.49 0.013 -331.5268 -39.09433 
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Boom 29.05974 8.570028 3.39 0.001 12.24802 45.87147 
_cons 139.6168 60.17649 2.32 0.02 21.56929 257.6643 
By looking at the tables above, it becomes clear that acquisitions do have a 
direct effect on profit, as measured by EBIT.  However, intra-segment acquisitions 
seem to have a much smaller effect than inter-segment acquisitions. To some extent 
this may be because their positive influence on profit is captured by the increasing 
market share. To test this assumption I constructed a model to measure how 
market share is affected by acquisitions.  This model used three-year average of 
market share as the dependent variable. Only the three different types of 
acquisitions are used as independent variables. 
The results with a model with are shown in Table 13. The explanatory 
power of the model is quite weak with within R-square only 0.03. The independent 
variables still explain some of the between-groups effects. 
Table 13: Effects of acquisition activity on market share 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors 
Number 
of obs = 12174  
Method: Fixed-effects 
regression 
Number 
of groups = 1382  
Group variable (i): gvkey F(  3, 1381) = 16.56  
maximum lag: 2 Prob > F = 0  
  Within R-squared = 0.0263  
  Drisc/Kraay    
Market Share Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
IntraSeg 0.003083 0.001488 2.07 
0.03
9 
0.00016
3 0.006003 
InterSeg 0.049924 0.007115 7.02 0 
0.03596
6 0.063882 
InterInd 0.00476 0.006222 0.76 
0.44
4 -0.00745 0.016965 
_cons 0.047587 0.002124 22.41 0 
0.04342
1 0.051753 
The model shows that all acquisitions do increase market share, but the 
effect is significantly higher for inter-segment acquisitions than for intra-segment 
ones. However, this may be a case of reverse-causality with firms that have a high 
market share in their original segment expanding into new segments by 
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acquisitions. I tested for this by using lagged market share of up to three years. The 
results stayed roughly similar, which indicates that reverse causality is at least not 
the main cause of this effect. 
To test for hypothesis 4a that assumed that inter-segment acquisitions 
where the acquirer enters a new segment have smaller positive effect on financial 
performance I added a moderating variable of entering a new segment with an 
inter-segment acquisition. The results of the model with all the variables significant 
at 5 percent confidence level are shown in Table 14. Both the F-test as well as the 
R-square gives quite large values which suggest that the model explains quite well 
both within- and between-groups effects. The moderating term has a statistically 
very significant negative coefficient. This means that inter-segment acquisitions 
have a smaller impact on profit when they are made on a new segment. 
Table 14: Effect on EBIT of inter-segment acquisitions while entering a new segment 
Regression with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors Number of obs = 12132  
Method: Fixed-effects 
regression Number of groups = 1381  
Group variable (i): gvkey F(  7, 1380) = 12.17  
maximum lag: 2 Prob > F = 0  
 within  R-squared = 0.1916  
EBIT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
InterSeg 793.237 130.1161 6.1 0 537.9903 1048.484 
interSeg_x_Enter 
New -198.9356 42.41801 -4.69 0 -282.1464 -115.7249 
Enter New -194.1192 59.8581 -3.24 0.001 -311.5419 -76.69648 
Acquisition 
activity -2.823757 1.04492 -2.7 0.007 -4.873561 -0.7739524 
Concentration 117.0217 43.87348 2.67 0.008 30.95578 203.0877 
Market Share 714.0174 221.9908 3.22 0.001 278.5415 1149.493 
Boom 40.15377 10.18223 3.94 0 20.17945 60.12809 
Segment Growth 2.793772 1.196125 2.34 0.02 0.4473514 5.140193 
_cons -125.2051 43.32896 -2.89 0.004 -210.2029 -40.20739 
 To sum the results on effects of acquisition activity on financial 
performance, it can be concluded that intra- and inter-segment and inter-industry 
acquisitions have a positive effect on profit as measured by EBIT. Both a high rate 
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of entering new segments as well as making an inter-segment acquisition from a 
new segment affect profit negatively. 
Figure 13 plots all observations of acquisition activity and EBIT changes. 
Both acquisition activity and the EBIT changes are calculated as three year 
averages with different types of acquisitions summed together. The dots show the 
median values for all acquisition levels. Two outliers are left out of the figure. The 
figure shows quite clearly that there is a connection between changes in EBIT and 
number of acquisitions. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two is 0.41 
when the outliers are included and when they are excluded it rises to 0.60 which is 
quite significant.  This confirms the earlier findings of a connection between EBIT 
increases and acquisitions. 
Figure 13: EBIT changes by acquisition activity 
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 I also tested the results for reverse causality, namely that good financial 
performance would drive companies to undertake acquisitions. To test for this I 
Results
 
   
74 
   
 
 
used a lagging EBIT as the dependent variable. Results are summed up in Table 15. 
The slight difference between the non-lagged coefficients in Table 13 is the result of 
dot-com boom as a control variable due to the incompatible timing. Still, the 
coefficients as well as the order of the different acquisitions remain the same for 
the different lags.  This would suggest that reverse causality is not a direct cause for 
the observed effects and acquisitions may indeed be a cause of profit instead of a 
symptom. 
Table 15: Coefficients of independent variables for different lags in EBIT 
Variable/ Lag 0 -1 -2 -3 
IntraSeg 48 61 75 77 
InterSeg 509 639 752 856 
InterInd 92 111 138 163 
Rate Of Entry -384 -450 -462 -448 
5.7 Results with ITS excluded 
As shown earlier, the biggest segment Information technology services (ITS) makes 
up almost half of the sales and almost one third of the firms. This segment differs 
from the others in that it contains a variety of different firms, many of them with 
quite different focus. Some examples include hardware manufacturers that also 
supply consultancy and information management systems such as IBM and Fujitsu. 
Others include several technology consultancies that have a much higher marginal 
costs than pure software firms. 
In order to test the robustness of my results, I also tested my hypotheses 
while excluding this segment. This reduced the sample to 1022 firms with a total of 
8 635 observations. Table 16 shows the tests for hypotheses 1a-3a and 5a. The 
coefficients are all statistically significant and they are rather similar than with all 
segments included. However, the constant term is not statistically significant which 
suggests that the model is not completely reliable. 
Table 16: Effects on EBIT with ITS excluded 
Regression with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors Number of obs = 8635  
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Method: Fixed-effects 
regression Number of groups = 1022  
Group variable (i): gvkey F(  8, 1021) = 27.5  
maximum lag: 2 Prob > F = 0  
  Within R-squared = 0.141  
  Drisc/Kraay    
EBIT3yr Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
IntraSeg 57.30587 14.16318 4.05 0 29.51359 85.09815 
InterSeg 550.7819 108.1534 5.09 0 338.5536 763.0102 
InterInd 100.2403 36.83619 2.72 0.007 27.957 172.5236 
Enter New -423.208 59.13967 -7.16 0 -539.257 -307.158 
Concentration 142.2298 56.77607 2.51 0.012 30.81864 253.6409 
Market Share 677.6459 245.8557 2.76 0.006 195.2057 1160.086 
Survival -170.417 86.62684 -1.97 0.049 -340.404 -0.43033 
Boom 40.27837 12.44546 3.24 0.001 15.85676 64.69998 
_cons 15.32894 50.54318 0.3 0.762 -83.8514 114.5093 
Table 17 shows the results of testing hypotheses 1b-5b with ITS excluded. 
There is a marked difference only on hypothesis 1b that was previously significant 
at p<0.05 but currently only at p<0.1. Other results are similar to those with all 
segments included. 
Table 17: Effects on survival with ITS excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES base h1a h2a h3a h4a h5a 
       
Survival3yr -3.310*** -3.278*** -3.312*** -3.306*** -3.296*** -3.264*** 
Acquisition 
activity 
0.000817 0.000123 -0.00556 0.00109 -0.00749 -0.00541 
Segment 
Growth 
0.000125 0.000165 0.000516 4.80e-05 0.000626 0.000852 
Concentration 0.350 0.372* 0.333 0.346 0.340 0.363* 
Market Share -1.864*** -1.902*** -2.040*** -1.843*** -1.992*** -1.935*** 
Boom 0.0342 0.0298 0.0351 0.0353 0.0377 0.0366 
IntraSeg  0.127*     
InterSeg   0.334**  0.352**  
InterInd    -0.200   
Enter New      -0.795**  
interSeg_x_ 
Enter New 
    0.272  
Rate Of Entry      0.491** 
       
Observations 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 
Spells 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 
Number of firms 997 997 997 997 997 997 
Events 690 690 690 690 690 690 
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Chi2 86.65 89.06 92.11 87.30 93.23 95.37 
The similarity of results without companies in Information technology 
services to those with all segments included suggests that the results can be 
generalized across the industry. 
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6 Discussion and conclusions 
In this section I will present a summary of my results as well as discuss possible 
explanations for them. The section also includes some thoughts on the limits of the 
study as well as managerial and research implication for future research. 
6.1 Summary of the results 
This study aimed to answer the question of what kinds of acquisition strategies 
work best in a hypercompetitive industry. To answer the question I created five 
hypotheses that looked at different types of acquisitions and how they affect both 
survival and financial performance of focal firms. The survival of focal firms was 
analyzed by using Cox regression (Cox, 1972). Financial performance was analyzed 
by using OLS-regression models where EBIT was the dependent variable. The 
results of the tests are summarized in Table 18. Those cases where the p for the 
variable itself was greater than 0.05, are listed as only inconclusive, whereas the 
rest are listed according to their signs. 
Table 18: Summary of the results 
  Effect on survival Effect on financial performance 
  Hypothesis Real Hypothesis Real 
Intra-segment 
acquisitions Positive Negative Positive Positive 
Inter-segment 
acquisitions Positive Negative Positive Positive 
Inter-industry acquisitions Positive Inconclusive Positive Positive 
Acquisitions from known 
segments Positive Inconclusive Positive Positive  
High entry rate Negative Negative Negative Negative  
My first hypothesis concerned the effect of intra-segment acquisitions. I 
assumed that these would be good for both survival and financial performance as 
they enable the focal firm to increase its market share. However, survival of the 
firm is affected negatively by acquisitions made from the same segment whereas 
the effect on financial performance is positive. 
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Acquisitions from other segments within the same industry were the subject 
of my second hypothesis. My hypothesis stated that these would improve both the 
survival rate and profitability by enabling firms to diversify into new businesses. 
The opposite is supported by the survival model but the data from financial 
performance showed a positive effect. 
Third hypothesis was about the effect of inter-industry acquisitions and how 
they might affect survival and financial performance. My assumption was that the 
effect would be positive on both of these. For financial performance this seems to 
hold but the results for survival are inconclusive. The main problem was that inter-
industry acquisitions were quite rare with less than one seventh of all acquisitions. 
They were also quite concentrated temporarily with 215 out of 415 occurring 
between 1996 and 2001. Some of the effects of inter-industry activity might then 
simply be captured by the effects of the dot-com boom and bust. 
My fourth hypothesis was related to the extent to which effect inter-
segmental acquisitions was influenced by the acquirer having previous acquisition 
experience from the segment. My assumption that this kind of acquisitions would 
have more positive effect on financial performance and survival was supported in 
the case of financial performance but for survival the results were inconclusive. 
The effect of entering new segments was also tested by the fifth hypothesis 
which speculated that firms that enter new segments at a high rate would have 
both lower survival and weaker financial performance. This hypothesis was 
supported by data on both counts. 
6.2 Analysis of the results 
There is quite a contradiction between the two columns in Table 18. On 
survival, the results suggest that acquisitions in general are harmful as three of the 
five independent variables had negative effect on survival. For financial 
performance the effect is broadly positive with both inter-segment and inter-
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industry acquisitions having clearly positive effect on profits. 
The results clearly contradict the prediction of complexity theory that firms 
could improve their survival prospects in a dynamic industry by engaging in active 
local search and exploration (Levinthal, 1997). Both local search in the focal firm’s 
original segment and exploration into other segments lead to a decrease in survival 
rate. Instead of making firms fitter, they increase the risk of becoming acquired or 
going bankrupt. This may be because of overstretching in firm’s integration 
resources and a failure to develop the key learnings from earlier acquisitions.  
Earlier research has shown that acquisitions are linked to performance with 
a U-curve (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Although there was no such finding in this 
study, it might be that there exists an optimum amount of acquisitions from the 
perspective of survival. 
Research on acquisition performance has found both that related 
diversification creates more value than unrelated diversification (Anand & Singh, 
1997; Rheaume, 2008; Singh & Montgomery, 1987) and that the opposite holds 
(Lubatkin, 1987; Seth, 1990). In those studies where the focus has been on other 
measures than the stock price the results are that consolidation oriented 
acquisitions and acquisitions based on strategic fit fare better than the rest (Anand 
& Singh, 1997; Hopkins, 1987a). In this study intra-, inter-segment and inter-
industry acquisitions all increased profit, with inter-segment acquisitions having 
the greatest effect. However, acquisitions from totally new segments and a high 
rate of entry into new segments had a negative effect on profit. 
There were big differences in effects on acquisition on survival between 
firms that got acquired and those that got bankrupt. Probability of becoming an 
acquisition target was increased by dot-com boom, high EBIT margins, intra-
segment acquisitions and high rate of entry into new segments. Market share and 
rate of survival in the focal firm’s segment reduced the possibility. For bankrupt 
firms the only significant effect was inter-segment acquisitions that increased the 
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likelihood of going bankrupt. 
That high profitability should increase the chances of becoming acquired 
supports earlier research (Barnes, 1990).  The link between intra-segment 
acquisitions and becoming acquired is less clear, although it could be that firms 
that try to consolidate their position in their focal segment become more enticing 
targets for acquirers from other segments. 
The tendency of inter-segment acquisitions to increase chances of going 
bankrupt points to a strain in resources that inter-segment acquisitions from new 
segments bring and which was also proved by hypothesis 4a. While inter-
segmental acquisitions do increase the profit of the acquirer, overreach can cause 
the acquirer to go bankrupt before it can reap the rewards from its actions. 
There are also clear differences between acquisitions done by more 
profitable and more financially solvent companies and their less financially sound 
competitors. Companies with better financial position are negatively affected by 
intra-segmental acquisitions where as those in a weaker position are affected by 
both inter-segment acquisition and a fast rate of entry into new segments.  
These differences suggest that companies with more resources are better 
able to build positions in new markets. Their major threat is acquiring too strong 
position in the focal segment which makes them a good target for new entrants 
planning to enter the market. Weaker companies tend to strain their resources and 
become victims of bankruptcy or acquisition, especially so when they enter new 
segments. 
The results also differ depending on the time period under consideration. 
Software industry underwent a dramatic change during the time period under 
research. Dividing the data into the three subsets introduction, growth and 
maturity shows that during the introduction phase no variable was statistically 
significant.  This is most likely due to the fact that exits as well as acquisitions in 
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that period were relatively rare.  
In the growth phase of 1994-1998 inter-segmental acquisitions and entering 
new segments had a strong negative effect on survival. Also acquisition rate in 
target segment was a significant negative factor. Market share in the focal segment 
had a positive effect as it reduced the likelihood of becoming acquired during a 
period of rapid entries but also initial consolidation in many segments. 
In the maturing phase 1999-2006 survival rate in the focal segment as well 
as market share and segment growth had a significant positive effect on survival. A 
high rate of entry had still negative effects, where as other independent variables 
had no effects. This indicates that as the number of firms started to drop the 
importance of focal segment increased. A segment that was still growing rapidly 
and where others were surviving was more likely to provide good chances of 
survival. However, firms that had entered new businesses too rapidly and had not 
been able to consolidate those positions sufficiently were in danger of becoming 
acquired or going bankrupt. 
A possible reason for the difference between hypotheses a and b is also that 
there is simply survivorship bias. Firms that went bankrupt or were acquired after 
making acquisitions are not present in the sample when profits are calculated. So 
acquisitions seem to be good for firms that continue operations. 
It is also possible that there is simply a misapprehension of correlation and 
causality. Firms make acquisitions because they are profitable and as I 
demonstrated, profit is highly autocorrelated. So acquisitions would not be a cause 
but a symptom of financial performance. This kind of causality is hard to test in 
general and in panel studies especially so. In this study I used lagging EBIT to test 
for reverse causality and found no evidence to support the assumption about its 
existence. 
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6.3 Limitations of the research 
The focus of this study was the software industry. Software industry was initially 
chosen as an example of a hypercompetitive industry with changing competitive 
advantages, rapid technological change and low entry barriers. Although these 
characteristics are common to other hypercompetitive industries as well, the 
results should not be generalized to other industries without accounting for 
possible industry-specific characteristics such as the rapid business cycle of 1995-
2003 and the constant erosion of competitive advantages.  
The study was also strictly focused only on American companies and firms 
that were traded in US exchanges. There might be some country-specific issues 
such as the availability of capital for acquisitions and the state of corporate 
governance that would change the results in other countries. 
6.4 Methodology 
The use of both survival analysis and financial performance to assess the effect of 
acquisitions increases the reliability of results, as studying only the financial 
performance would lead to considerable survivorship bias and focusing only on 
survival would miss the performance differences between the survivors. 
Studies on acquisition performance have traditionally relied on short-term 
cumulative abnormal stock returns (Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; 
Shelton, 1988; Seth, 1990). Use of CAR is quite dependent on the efficient market 
assumption that investors are able to evaluate the pros and cons of an acquisition 
and its future effects in relatively short time-period. The use of panel-data allows 
the move away from the stock-market based estimation, but by lumping all 
acquisitions done in year into three variables it risks missing out important 
differences between the acquisitions. This is especially so, concerning some control 
variables such as deal size and acquisition activity in target segment that are 
calculated as averages of several acquisitions. However, survival analysis does not 
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lend itself to event studies. 
The idea of segmentation rests on the assumption that all firms can be 
placed in only one segment where they do their principal business.  However, as 
companies expand their initial business through acquisitions it becomes 
increasingly difficult to say what are they about. Is Yahoo an Internet search engine 
or Internet platform? Where to draw the line between clicks, pure e-business 
companies, and bricks-and-clicks, companies that utilize e-business in their 
traditional operations? Especially critical is the line between software industry and 
other industries as more and more companies have moved such traditional tasks as 
processing medical transcriptions on computers. As the segmentation presented in 
this study was based mostly on subjective categories and personal judgment it is 
clear that the results must be taken with a pinch of salt.  If a widely accepted, 
transparent, and up-to-date categorizing of software industry exists, it would be 
interesting to re-do this analysis to see if the results supported my conclusions. 
There was also no accounting for divestments that are a relatively popular 
method of getting rid of poor acquisitions in software industry (Junna, 2008). 
Separating divested acquisitions might have changed the results and differentiated 
between those companies that manage to get rid of acquisitions gone wrong and 
those that don’t. 
6.5 Data 
As the study included data from two different databases, there is an obvious scope 
for errors and mistakes in conversion and combining. Although the SDC database is 
supposed to hold information concerning all acquisitions, there were some glaring 
omissions such as the case of eBay that was listed as having made only 1 
acquisition during the time period although it is documented as having made 12 of 
them in the United States alone (Wikipedia, 2009). This does not suggest that the 
entire data set is corrupted, mainly that there are some issues with its reliability. 
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A major problem in the study was the lack of information concerning deal 
sizes. It is hard to estimate the importance of the deal for the acquiring firm 
without knowing its size. Most of the deals where information is not available are 
probably smallish ones, but there still exists considerable variance between them.  
6.6 Implications and further research 
6.7 Managerial implications 
For managers of companies in hypercompetitive industries such as software this 
study seems to point out the risks of engaging in acquisitions, at least without good 
preparation. Acquisitions seem to increase the risk of ceasing to exist, whether by 
acquisition or bankruptcy, and these cases have usually negative implications for 
the managers concerned. 
This is especially true for acquisitions from new segments. The study 
showed that these tend to have a negative effect on financial performance. A high 
rate of expansion affected both survival and financial performance negatively. Good 
examples of this kind of acquisition sprees abounded during the dot-com era when 
many companies simply used their inflated stock prices to grow their businesses 
without considering the inherent logic of the deals. 
However, acquisitions can create value for a company in a hypercompetitive 
industry such as the software business. This is evident from the examples of such 
large and successful businesses as Microsoft, IBM, Symantec and Oracle that made 
more than 200 acquisitions between them in the research period. The key issue is 
that acquisitions should be part of a well-planned strategy instead of separate 
actions as acquisition strategies are demonstrably more likely to create value for 
the shareholders (Hopkins, 1987b). 
Also, initial financial position of the company matters for the success of 
acquisitions. Companies with higher margins and stronger balance sheets can 
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engage in inter-segmental acquisitions and enter new segments with less risk than 
their weaker competitors. So, firms should initially build a strong position in their 
own segment before entering new businesses. However, the results suggest that 
building a position in focal segment is better done organically, as intra-segment 
acquisitions increase the risk of financially strong companies becoming acquired. 
Intra-segment acquisitions are also financially less profitable than inter-segment 
ones. 
The results suggest that after the initial entry, acquisitions from other 
segments can help companies to increase profits and create multiple positions of 
strength. These in turn help companies to survive as multi-market presence 
improves survival rate (Laamanen & Keil, unpublished).  
Acquisitions can be used to create and strengthen stronghold positions in 
new markets. However, they seem to be an inferior method of growing market 
share in original business.  
Managers also must identify which part of the industry lifecycle are they 
currently in. As the results indicate there is an especially clear difference between 
the growth and the maturing phases with the former being less suitable time for 
entering new segments by acquisition. 
6.8 Research implications 
This study is part of the research into acquisition strategies and performance of 
acquisitions. The field is by no means new, as shown in the literature review 
section. However, most of the field is focused on single acquisitions, although serial 
acquisitions and acquisition strategies are often an integral part of corporate 
strategy (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). 
Most of the research has also been focused on how acquisitions affect stock 
prices with minority of studies looking at other financial indicators. From my study 
it is clear that acquisitions also have a significant effect on company survival. It 
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would be interesting to take this study further in order to find out what factors are 
most influential for survival when undertaking acquisition strategies.  
Considering acquisition performance, there are many conflicting studies on 
the relative benefits of diversification versus consolidation. My study supports the 
views of Singh & Montgomery (1987) and Shelton (1988), in that acquisitions from 
other segments of the industry or other industries have positive effect on profit. 
These sorts of acquisitions can be classified as related diversification. 
From the point of complexity theory the picture is a bit more muddled. Both 
intra-segment acquisitions, the kind of that mostly resemble local search, and inter-
segment acquisitions, more like exploration or random search, seem to have 
negative effect on survival. The effect is especially stark for companies that enter 
new segments at a rapid rate. These companies are constantly trying to jump to 
new locations without establishing themselves in any particular place. However, 
some successful companies such as Microsoft have a long history of entering new 
businesses by acquisitions. Future research could also establish the factors that 
separate successful expansionists that succeed in creating new businesses from 
those who fail to strengthen their existing business or to create new revenue 
streams. My results suggest that financial strength is an important determinant in 
acquisition success but exact measures and the effect of organizational and 
managerial factors is still undetermined. 
I have to admit that my results seem to create more questions than they give 
answers to. The biggest of these new questions concerns the difference between 
effects on financial performance and survival. I assumed this to be due to 
survivorship bias and differences in the financial position of the acquirers, but it 
would be interesting to replicate this study in other industries to see if these results 
can be replicated. 
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8 Appendices 
Testing interdependence between market share and acquisitions 
 
Cox regression for the period 1980-1993 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES base h1a h2a h3a h4a h5a 
Survival 2.918 3.092 3.245 2.934 3.303 2.907 
Acquisition activity -33.85 -43.84 -1.180 -36.79 -1.022 -32.90 
Segment Growth -1.009* -0.983 -0.994* -1.030* -1.002* -1.005* 
Concentration -0.275 -0.286 -0.286 -0.271 -0.276 -0.274 
Market Share 0.728 0.780 0.780 0.756 0.791 0.728 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES base h1a h1b h2a h2b h3a h3b 
Survival -0.0172 -0.00226 0.0404 -0.00959 0.0436 -0.0178 0.0236 
Acquisition activity 0.00512 0.00421 0.00528 0.00325 0.000564 0.00535 0.00629 
Segment Growth -
0.00463 
-0.00450 -0.00294 -0.00477 -0.00281 -0.00465 -0.00276 
Concentration 0.0812 0.1000 0.0864 0.0712 0.0503 0.0793 0.0617 
IntraSeg 
 
0.131** 0.125 
    
Market Share 
  
-2.044*** 
 
-2.109*** 
 
-1.864*** 
intraSeg_x_ 
MarketShare 
  
0.321 
    
InterSeg 
   
0.0969 0.319** 
  
interSeg_x_ 
MarketShare 
    
-0.0712 
  
InterInd 
     
-0.119 0.107 
interInd_x_ 
MarketShare 
      
-2.743 
        
Observations 10491 10491 10491 10491 10491 10491 10491 
Spells 10491 10491 10491 10491 10491 10491 10491 
Number of firms 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 
Events 958 958 958 958 958 958 958 
Chi2 1.559 4.811 40.96 2.310 42.02 1.882 37.74 
Appendices
 
   
95 
  95 
 
 
EBIT margin 0.713 0.648 0.765 0.742 0.765 0.707 
IntraSeg  1.505*     
InterSeg   -128.0  -127.9  
InterInd    -2.718   
interSeg_x_EnterNew     2.832  
EnterNew     -0.960  
Rate Of Entry      0.135 
       
Observations 2397 2397 2397 2397 2397 2397 
Spells 2397 2397 2397 2397 2397 2397 
Number of firms 414 414 414 414 414 414 
Events 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Chi2 15.12 17.65 19.74 17.06 20.10 15.14 
 
Cox regression for the period 1994-1998 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES base h1a h2a h3a h4a h5a 
Survival 0.892 0.937 0.842 0.891 1.128 1.042 
Acquisition activity 0.0233** 0.0225** 0.00400 0.0233** -0.00492 0.00119 
Segment Growth 0.0199 0.0199 0.0200 0.0199 0.0203 0.0185 
Concentration 0.439 0.450 0.424 0.438 0.392 0.537 
Market Share -2.505** -2.521** -3.475** -2.501** -3.469** -2.685** 
EBIT margin 0.144 0.142 0.140 0.144 0.136 0.121 
IntraSeg  0.102     
InterSeg   0.719**  0.557**  
InterInd    -0.0407   
interSeg_x 
EnterNew 
    0.116  
Enter New     0.496**  
Rate Of Entry      1.216*** 
       
Observations 2865 2865 2865 2865 2865 2865 
Spells 2865 2865 2865 2865 2865 2865 
Number of firms 881 881 881 881 881 881 
Appendices
 
   
96 
  96 
 
 
Events 198 198 198 198 198 198 
Chi2 18.69 19.04 25.72 18.70 36.29 34.91 
 
Cox regression for the period 1999-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES base h1a h2a h3a h4a h5a 
Survival3yr -2.997*** -2.999*** -2.960*** -2.974*** -2.866*** -2.901*** 
Acquisition activity 0.00552 0.00466 0.00222 0.00599 0.00627 -0.00187 
Segment Growth -0.580** -0.583** -0.590** -0.580** -0.502* -0.554** 
Concentration 0.382 0.403 0.357 0.362 0.456 0.361 
Market Share -2.075** -2.185** -2.434** -2.002** -2.603** -2.336** 
EBIT_margin 0.0250 0.0244 0.0249 0.0251 0.0257 0.0250 
IntraSeg  0.131     
InterSeg   0.252  0.284*  
InterInd    -0.449   
interSeg_x_ 
EnterNew 
    0.347*  
Enter New     -0.572**  
Rate Of Entry      0.788*** 
       
Observations 4856 4856 4856 4856 4856 4856 
Spells 4856 4856 4856 4856 4856 4856 
Number of firms 1052 1052 1052 1052 1052 1052 
Events 382 382 382 382 382 382 
Chi2 43.87 45.83 45.78 45.92 57.37 58.06 
 
